the individual body to space in general, viz., as a section of it, so that, by thinking away all limitations from our mind, we find God in us and ourselves in him, it shows how nearly he verges on pantheism. [Footnote 1: Edm. Pfleiderer, _Geulincx, als Hauptvertreter der occasionalistischen Metaphysik und Ethik_, Tübingen, 1882; the same, _Leibniz und Geulincx mit besonderer Beziehung auf ihr Uhrengleichnis_, Tübingen, 1884.] [Footnote 2: See Ed. Zeller, _Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften_, 1884, p. 673 _seq_.; Eucken, _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xix., 1893, p. 525 _seq_; vol. xxiii., 1887, p. 587 _seq_.] Geulincx's services to noëtics have been duly recognized by Ed. Grimm (Jena, 1875), although with an excessive approximation to Kant. In this field he advances many acute and suggestive thoughts, as the deduction which reappears in Lotze, that the actually existent world of figure and motion cognized by thought, though the real world, is poorer than the wonderful world of motley sensuous appearance conjured forth in our minds on the occasion of the former, that the latter is the more beautiful and more worthy of a divine author. Further, the conviction, also held by Lotze, that the fundamental activities of the mind cannot be defined, but only known through inner experience or immediate consciousness (he who loves, knows what love is; it is a _per conscientiam et intimam experientiam notissima res_); the praiseworthy attempt to give a systematic arrangement, according to their derivation from one another, to the innate mathematical concepts, which Descartes had simply co-ordinated (the concept of surface is gained from the concept of body by abstracting from the third dimension, thickness--the act of thus abstracting from certain parts of the content of thought, Geulincx terms _consideratio_ in contrast to _cogitatio_, which includes the whole content); and, finally, the still more important inquiry, whether it is possible for us to reach a knowledge of things independently of the forms of the understanding, as in pure thought we strip off the fetters of sense. The possibility of this is denied; there is no higher faculty of knowledge to act as judge over the understanding, as the latter over the sensibility, and even the wisest man cannot free himself from the forms of thought (categories, _modi cogitandi_). And yet the discussion of the question is not useless: the reason should examine into the unknowable as well as the knowable; it is only in this way that we learn that it is unknowable. As the highest forms of thought Geulincx names subject (the empty concept of an existent, _ens_ or _quod est_) and predicate _(modus entis_), and derives them from two fundamental activities of the mind, a combining function _(simulsumtio, totatio_) and an abstracting function (one which removes the _nota subjecti_). Substance and accident, substantive and adjective, are