In all cases of physical change produced by one body in
another, it is generally possible to assume such a meaning
of action, that the reaction shall be of the same nature as
the action; and when this is done, the third axiom of
causation, that reaction is equal to action, is universally
true. Thus if a hot body heat a cold one, the change may be
conceived as the transfer of a certain substance, _heat_ or
_caloric_, from the first body to the second. On this
supposition, the first body _loses_ just as much heat as the
other _gains_; action and reaction are equal. But if the
reaction be of a different kind to the action we can no
longer apply the axiom. If a hot body _melt_ a cold one, the
latter _cools_ the former: here, then, is reaction; but so
long as the action and reaction are stated in this form, we
cannot assert any equality between them.
In treating of the secondary mechanical sciences, we {191}
shall see further in what way we may conceive the physical
action of one body upon another, so that the same axioms
which are the basis of the science of Mechanics shall apply
to changes not at first sight manifestly mechanical.
The three axioms of causation which we have now stated are
the fundamental maxims of all reasoning concerning causes as
to their quantities; and it will be shown in the sequel that
these axioms form the basis of the science of Mechanics,
determining its form, extent, and certainty. We must,
however, in the first place, consider how we acquire those
conceptions upon which the axioms now established are to be
employed.
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