For a long time the sole information obtained was from wounded men, and was very indefinite. At 5-55 a.m. it was learned that the first objective had been taken, that the second was being attacked, and that the two assaulting battalions were badly mixed. Ten minutes later a wounded man reported that A Company had taken its objective. Then there was little news for more than an hour and a half. Two carrying parties were sent forward, and it is believed that a few bombs did reach the German front line and were used by the 5th Battalion. Runners were twice sent out to get in touch with B Company, but none came back. Information that the attack of the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left had failed was received by the Battalion about 6-30 a.m. Knowing so little of the situation, the Commanding Officer naturally hesitated to throw any more troops into the battle; and, as events turned out, it is well he did not use his reserves, for they could have done little real good, and there would only have been more casualties. At last a wounded runner arrived from B Company, bearing the following message from Sec.-Lieut. H. E. Pohlmann:-- “To I.R. Am holding point 54 and to left 100 yds. In touch with 5th. Only remaining officer in B Coy. Bombs wanted. 6-40 a.m. 3.9.16. H. E. Pohlmann, 2 Lt. B Coy.” It had taken the runner two hours to come. At once Major Walker ordered two platoons of C Company, and two of the reserve bombing teams, to advance across the open and reinforce B Company. But these orders were never issued. Before they could be written out the advanced signal station reported that the men of the 147th Infantry Brigade were withdrawing. C Company had not been engaged, but it had suffered many casualties from shell fire. When it was clear that the attack had failed, Capt. Marshall was ordered to man the parallels, in case the enemy tried to counter-attack. But no such attempt was made. At 11-50 a.m., more than four hours after it had been written, a message was brought in from Lieut. Everitt, by a wounded runner. Arriving so late, it was of no practical use; the situation had entirely changed. But as evidence of the deeds of A Company that day, it deserves to be quoted in full:-- “To the Adjt. My right is only at the communication trench point 86. I am partly in the fifth lines. I have only roughly 25 men including six from B Coy. Have no bombers. Short of bombs and Lewis Gun ammunition. Our artillery firing into our back especially on the right. Don’t know where D Coy. are. W. N. Everitt, Lt., 3.9.16. 7-40 a.m. O.C. A Coy.”