The small number in this division who were taken prisoner by the enemy verifies the assertion made before that the Negro would sacrifice his life or submit to deadly wounds rather than be captured. When only five out of a total of about 30,000 fell into the Germans' hands alive, it gives some idea of the desperate resistance they put up. Perhaps the stories they had heard about the wanton slaughter of prisoners by the Hun or the brutalities practiced on those who were permitted to live, had something to do with the attitude of the Negroes against being captured; but a more likely solution is that their very spirit to advance and win and to accept death in preference to being conquered, caused the small number in the prisoner list, and the large number in the lists of other casualties. Considering the desperate advance made by the 92nd Division from Pont a Mousson the morning of November 10th, through a valley swept by the tremendous guns of Metz and thousands of machine guns, the casualty list really is slight. Advancing over such dangerous ground to gain their objective, it appears miraculous that the division was not wiped out, or at least did not suffer more heavily than it did. An explanation of this seeming miracle has been offered in the rapidity of the advance. No two battles are ever fought alike. Offensives and defensives will be planned along certain lines. Then will suddenly obtrude the element of surprise or something that could not be foreseen or guarded against, which will overturn the most carefully prepared plans. No soldiers in the world were ever trained to a higher degree of efficiency than the Germans. Mathematical precision ruled everywhere; the ultimate detail had been considered; and all students of military matters were forced to admit that they had reduced warfare seemingly, to an exact science. But it was a mistake. The Germans were the victims of surprise times innumerable. Some of the greatest events of the war, notably the first defeat at the Marne in its strategic features, was a complete surprise to them. Everything about war, can, it seems, be reduced to a science except strategy. Certain rules can be laid down governing strategy, but they do not always work. Generally speaking, it is psychology; something which exists in the other man's mind. To read the other man's mind or make a good guess at it, defeats the most scientifically conceived strategy. Napoleon outwitted the best military brains and was himself the greatest strategist of his time, because he invariably departed from fixed military customs and kept his opponent entirely at sea regarding what he was doing or intended to do. Very seldom did he do the thing which his enemy thought he would do; which seemed most likely and proper according to military science. He thought and acted quickly in crises, relied constantly on the element of surprise and invented new strategy on the spur of the moment.