DEAR MADAM.--Your letter of this date has just been handed to me, which recalls to my mind your great solicitude in reference to the security and welfare of your husband; but I need not say it recalls to my mind the subject matter of your solicitude, because that subject, except at short intervals, has not been absent from my mind. I can scarcely furnish you a justifiable apology for delaying a reply so long; but, be assured, madam, it is not for want of regard for you and your peace of mind that I have postponed, but a crowd of public business which has required my whole time, together with very ill health, since the receipt of your former letter; and it would be most gratifying to my feelings now if due regard to public duty would enable me to furnish such a reply as would fully conform to your wishes; but my duty in reference to all demands made by executives of other states for the surrender of fugitives from justice, appears to be plain and simple, consisting entirely of an executive, and not a judicial character, leaving me no discretion or adjudication as to the innocence or guilt of persons so demanded and charged with crime; and it is plain that the Constitution and laws of the United States, in reference to fugitives from justice, presumes and contemplates that the laws of the several states are ample to do justice to all who may be charged with crime; and the statute of this state simply requires, "That whenever the executive of any other state, or of any territory of the United States, shall demand of the executive of this state any person as a fugitive from justice, and shall have complied with the requisitions of the Act of Congress in that case {131} made and provided, it shall be the duty of the executive of this state to issue his warrant under the seal of the state to apprehend the said fugitive," &c. With the constitution and laws before me, my duty is so plainly marked out that it would be impossible to err, so long as I abstain from usurping the right of adjudication. I am aware that a strict enforcement of the laws by an executive, or a rigid administration of them by a judicial tribunal, often results in hardships to those involved; and to you it doubtless appears peculiarly so, in the present case of Mr. Smith.