The constitutional provision under which requisitions may be made by the governor of one state upon the governor of another was a substitute for the principle recognized by the law of nations, by which one sovereign is bound to deliver to another fugitives who have committed certain offenses. These offenses are of the deepest grade of criminality, and robbers, murderers and incendiaries, and those enumerated as proper to be surrendered. Following the analogy thus suggested, the provisions in our Constitution, it would seem, should be construed to embrace similar cases only, except, perhaps, those offenses which arise from an abuse of the same constitutional provision. That provision {178} must be guarded with the utmost care, or it will become intolerable. I do not think the circumstances of the case before me are of such grave import, or the offense itself of such high grade, as to justify the requisition desired. The power given by the Constitution ought not to be cheapened or applied to trifling offenses, or indeed to any that was not originally contemplated. For the reasons stated in Mr. Spencer's opinion, the governor of New York refused to make the requisition upon the governor of Illinois. The case certainly came within the letter of the law, but not within the spirit and meaning. So with the affidavit of Governor Boggs, when he swears that Smith has fled from justice. It may come within the letter of the Constitution; but does it come within its spirit and meaning? Does it show that Smith was in Missouri at the time of the commission of the crime, and that he fled from that state to evade being brought to justice for that crime? Or does it refer to the flight of Smith and the Mormons from Missouri some years since? I will refer to one more case of a similar nature. Lord Campbell, formerly attorney-general of England, in a recent debate in Parliament upon the subject of the Creole, made the following remarks: