History of the Conquest of PeruPrescott, William Hickling
History
History of the Conquest of Peru
Prescott, William Hickling
Incas; Peru -- History -- Conquest, 1522-1548
Pizarro would gladly have seen his little army strengthened by
reinforcements, however small the amount; and on that account
postponed his departure for several weeks. But no reinforcement
arrived; and, as he received no further tidings from his associates, he
judged that longer delay would, probably, be attended with evils greater
than those to be encountered on the march; that discontents would
inevitably spring up in a life of inaction, and the strength and spirits of
the soldier sink under the enervating influence of a tropical climate. Yet
the force at his command, amounting to less than two hundred soldiers in
all, after reserving fifty for the protection of the new settlement, seemed
but a small one for the conquest of an empire. He might, indeed, instead
of marching against the Inca, take a southerly direction towards the rich
capital of Cuzco. But this would only be to postpone the hour of
reckoning. For in what quarter of the empire could he hope to set his
foot, where the arm of its master would not reach him? By such a course,
moreover, he would show his own distrust of himself. He would shake
that opinion of his invincible prowess, which he had hitherto endeavored
to impress on the natives, and which constituted a great secret of his
strength; which, in short, held sterner sway over the mind than the
display of numbers and mere physical force. Worse than all, such a
course would impair the confidence of his troops in themselves and their
reliance on himself. This would be to palsy the arm of enterprise at
once. It was not to be thought of.
But while Pizarro decided to march into the interior, it is doubtful
whether he had formed any more definite plan of action. We have no
means of knowing his intentions, at this distance of time, otherwise than
as they are shown by his actions. Unfortunately, he could not write, and
he has left no record, like the inestimable Commentaries of Cortes, to
enlighten us as to his motives. His secretary, and some of his
companions in arms, have recited his actions in detail; but the motives
which led to them they were not always so competent to disclose.
It is possible that the Spanish general, even so early as the period of his
residence at San Miguel, may have meditated some daring stroke, some
effective coup-de-main, which, like that of Cortes, when he carried off
the Aztec monarch to his quarters, might strike terror into the hearts of
the people, and at once decide the fortunes of the day. It is more
probable, however, that he now only proposed to present himself before
the Inca, as the peaceful representative of a brother monarch, and, by
these friendly demonstrations, disarm any feeling of hostility, or even of
suspicion. When once in communication with the Indian prince, he
could regulate his future course by circumstances.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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