History of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, by the House of Representatives, and his trial by the Senate for high crimes and misdemeanors in office, 1868Ross, Edmund G. (Edmund Gibson)
History
History of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, by the House of Representatives, and his trial by the Senate for high crimes and misdemeanors in office, 1868
Ross, Edmund G. (Edmund Gibson)
Johnson, Andrew, 1808-1875 -- Impeachment
The danger in such departures, even upon apparent necessity, if condoned
or permitted by public judgment is in the establishment of precedents
whereby greater and more dangerous infractions of organic law may be
invited, tolerated, and justified, till government takes on a form of
absolutism in one form or another, fatal to free institutions, fatal to
a government of law, and fatal to popular liberty.
On the other hand, a too ready resort to the power of impeachment as
a remedial agent--the deposition of a public officer in the absence
of proof of the most positive and convincing character of the
impeachability of the offense alleged, naturally tends to the other
extreme, till public officers may become by common consent removable by
impeachment upon insufficient though popular charges--even upon partisan
differences and on sharply contested questions of public administration.
The power of impeachment and removal becomes, therefore, a two-edged
sword, which must be handled with consummate judgment and skill, and
resort thereto had only in the gravest emergencies and for causes so
clearly manifest as to preclude the possibility of partisan divisions or
partisan judgments thereon. Otherwise, too ready resort to impeachment
must inevitably establish and bring into common use a new and dangerous
remedy for the cure of assumed political ills which have their origin
only in partisan differences as to methods of administration. It
would become an engine of partisan intolerance for the punishment and
ostracism of political opponents, under the operation of which the great
office of Chief Magistrate must inevitably lose its dignity, and
decline from its Constitutional rank as a co-ordinate department of
the Government, and its occupant no longer the political head and Chief
Executive of the Nation, except in name.
It was in that sense, and to a pointed degree, that in the impeachment
and trial of Andrew Johnson the quality of coordination of the three
great Departments of Government--the Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial--was directly involved--the House of Representatives as
prosecutor--the President as defendant--the Senate sitting as the trial
court in which the Chief Justice represented the judicial department as
presiding officer.
The anomaly of the situation was increased and its gravity intensified,
by the fact that the President pro tempore of the Senate, who stood
first in the line of succession to the Presidency in case of conviction,
was permitted, in a measure, indeed, forced by his pro-impeachment
colleagues, on a partisan division of the Senate, to sit and vote
as such President pro tempore for the impeachment and removal of the
President whom he was to succeed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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