That common sense of mankind which teaches them that theoretical opinions are to be calmly tried by their consequences and their accordance with facts, appears to have counteracted the prevalence of astrology in the better times of the human mind. Eudoxus, as we are informed by Cicero,[54\4] rejected the pretensions of the Chaldeans; and Cicero himself reasons against them with arguments as sensible and intelligent as could be adduced by a writer of the present day; such as the different fortunes and characters of persons born at the same time; and the failure of the predictions, in the case of Pompey, Crassus, Cæsar, to whom the astrologers had foretold glorious old age and peaceful death. He also employs an argument which the reader would perhaps not expect from him,--the very great remoteness of the planets as compared with the distance of the moon. "What contagion can reach us," he asks, "from a distance almost infinite?" [Note 54\4: Cic. _de Div._ ii. 42.] Pliny argues on the same side, and with some of the same arguments.[55\4] "Homer," he says, "tells us that Hector and Polydamus were born the same night;--men of such different fortune. And every hour, in every part of the world, are born lords and slaves, kings and beggars." [Note 55\4: _Hist. Nat._ vii. 49.] The impression made by these arguments is marked in an anecdote told concerning Publius Nigidius Figulus, a Roman of the time of Julius Cæsar, whom Lucan mentions as a celebrated astrologer. It is {220} said, that when an opponent of the art urged as an objection the different fates of persons born in two successive instants, Nigidius bade him make two contiguous marks on a potter's wheel, which was revolving rapidly near them. On stopping the wheel, the two marks were found to be really far removed from each other; and Nigidius is said to have received the name of Figulus (the potter), in remembrance of this story, His argument, says St. Augustine, who gives us the narrative, was as fragile as the ware which the wheel manufactured.