History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present timeWhewell, William
History
History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present time
Whewell, William
Science -- History
To this we reply, that _such_ knowledge is manifestly not of the
nature of that which we call _science_. If the beautiful and skilful
structures of the middle ages prove that mechanics then existed as a
science, mechanics must have existed as a science also among the
builders of the Cyclopean walls of Greece and Italy, or of our own
Stonehenge; for the masses which are there piled on each other, could
not be raised without considerable mechanical skill. But we may go
much further. The actions of every man who raises and balances
weights, or walks along a pole, take for granted the laws of
equilibrium; and even animals constantly avail themselves of such
principles. Are these, then, acquainted with mechanics as a science?
Again, if actions which are performed by taking advantage of
mechanical properties prove a knowledge of the science of mechanics,
they must also be allowed to prove a knowledge of the science of
geometry, when they proceed on geometrical properties. But the most
familiar actions of men and animals proceed upon geometrical truths.
The Epicureans held, as Proclus informs us, that even asses knew that
two sides of a triangle are greater than the third. And animals may
truly be said to have a practical knowledge of this truth; but they
have not, therefore, a science of geometry. And in like manner among
men, if we consider the matter strictly, a practical assumption of a
principle does not imply a speculative knowledge of it.
We may, in another way also, show how inadmissible are the works of
the Master Artists of the middle ages into the series of events which
mark the advance of Science. The following maxim is applicable to a
history, such as we are here endeavoring to write. We are employed in
tracing the progress of such general principles as constitute each of
the sciences which we are reviewing; and no facts or subordinate
truths belong to our scheme, except so far as they tend to or are
included in these higher principles; nor are they important to us, any
further than as they prove such principles. Now with regard to
processes of art like those which we have referred to, namely, the
inventions of the middle ages, let us ask, _what_ principle each of
them {242} illustrates? What chemical doctrine rests for its support
on the phenomena of gunpowder, or glass, or steel? What new harmonical
truth was illustrated in the Gregorian chant? What mechanical
principle unknown to Archimedes was displayed in the printing-press?
The practical value and use, the ingenuity and skill of these
inventions is not questioned; but what is their place in the history
of speculative knowledge? Even in those cases in which they enter into
such a history, how minute a figure do they make! how great is the
contrast between their practical and theoretical importance! They may
in their operation have changed the face of the world; but in the
history of the principles of the sciences to which they belong, they
may be omitted without being missed.
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