History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present timeWhewell, William
History
History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present time
Whewell, William
Science -- History
7. Thus, in this instance, the error of Aristotle was the neglect of
the Idea _appropriate_ to the facts, namely, the Idea of Mechanical
Cause, which is Force; and the substitution of vague or inapplicable
notions involving only relations of space or emotions of wonder. The
errors of those who failed similarly in other instances, were of the
same kind. To detail or classify these would lead us too far into
the philosophy of science; since we should have to enumerate the
Ideas which are appropriate, and the various classes of Facts on
which the different sciences are founded,--a task not to be now
lightly undertaken. But it will be perceived, without further
explanation, that it is necessary, in order to obtain from facts any
general truth, that we should apply to them that appropriate Idea,
by which permanent and definite relations are established among them.
In such Ideas the ancients were very poor, and the stunted and
deformed growth of their physical science was the result of this
penury. The Ideas of Space and Time, Number and Motion, they did
indeed possess distinctly; and so far as these went, their science
was tolerably healthy. They also caught a glimpse of the Idea of a
Medium by which the qualities of bodies, as colors and sounds, are
perceived. But the idea of Substance remained barren in their hands;
{90} in speculating about elements and qualities, they went the
wrong way, assuming that the properties of Compounds must _resemble_
those of the Elements which determine them; and their loose notions
of Contrariety never approached the form of those ideas of Polarity,
which, in modern times, regulate many parts of physics and
chemistry.
If this statement should seem to any one to be technical or
arbitrary, we must refer, for the justification of it, to the
Philosophy of Science, of which we hope hereafter to treat. But it
will appear, even from what has been here said, that there are
certain Ideas or Forms of mental apprehension, which may be applied
to Facts in such a manner as to bring into view fundamental
principles of science; while the same Facts, however arrayed or
reasoned about, so long as these appropriate ideas are not employed,
cannot give rise to any exact or substantial knowledge.
[2d Ed.] This account of the cause of failure in the physical
speculations of the ancient Greek philosophers has been objected to
as unsatisfactory. I will offer a few words in explanation of it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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