After his plans for the defence of Warsaw were communicated to the authorities of the city, he gave particular attention to those points on which he intended to support all his operations, and, relying on which, he could at any time hazard the boldest attempts. Having thus made Warsaw an axis, upon which all his operations could revolve, he proceeded to arrange his attack. In the first place he sent orders to general Dwernicki (_h_) to attack immediately the combined corps of generals Witt and Kreutz (_d_). In this attack the small corps of general Sierawski (_g_) was to aid, and the two corps were to preserve a constant communication with each other. For that object general Sierawski was to pass the Vistula at Kazimierz (12), and, avoiding an engagement with the enemy, to endeavor to join, as soon as possible, the corps of general Dwernicki, who received orders to leave Zamosc and approach Lublin (13). These two corps were to take such a position, that they could at any time retire upon Zamosc or Kazimierz. General Dwernicki was also informed that a third small corps would be sent in the direction of Zelechow (7) and Kock (2), to act in concert with him on the enemy's rear. If they should succeed in the attack, general Dwernicki was to endeavor to force the enemy to take the direction of Pulawy (9), to drive him into the angle formed by the Vistula (V) and the Wieprz (P); in fine, so to act as to cut off those two corps from all communication whatever with their main body. Leaving the corps of general Sierawski to continue to observe them, and to push his advantages over them, Dwernicki himself was to pass the Wieprz at Kock, and from thence by forced marches to leave in the direction of Radzyn (11) for Lukow (1) or Seroczyn (14), as circumstances might direct, and according as he should ascertain the position of the enemy to be. Arrived at Lukow or Seroczyn, as the case might be, he was to await there the orders of the general in chief, to join in the attack upon the main force of the enemy under Diebitsch (_e_), in which attack he was to act on the enemy's left wing. The main body of the enemy, thus taken in front and in flank, simultaneously, could not but have been broken up. For all these operations the general in chief had destined fourteen days only. On the night of the battle of Iganie, the general in chief having decided upon the above plan, sent officers in every direction with orders and instructions. The officers sent to the corps of general Dwernicki were enjoined to communicate their orders to him with the utmost haste.