all its baggage, ammunition, &c, and as many as two thousand prisoners and six pieces of artillery fell into our hands. The remains of his force fled along the great road (D), which was purposely left open to him. General Chrzanowski contented himself with occupying the town, in which he furnished himself with ammunition from the magazines, and, remaining there but a short time, left for the environs of Zamosc, in which fortress he deposited his prisoners. Conformably to his instructions, he remained in camp, near this fortress, at Labunia.[57] The general in chief having thus accomplished his object of supplying the place of general Dwernicki's corps, and holding in check the corps of Witt and Kreutz, in the palatinate of Lublin, it remained to him to complete his great plan by sending a corps into Lithuania. He decided to remove the only obstacle to this attempt by attacking the Russian imperial guard, which was somewhat detached from the Russian grand army. To carry this bold purpose into effect, the following instructions were given to the different commanders. [Illustration: _XXIX._] [Illustration: _XXX._] OPERATIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN GUARD. [_Plan_ XXIX.] On the 12th of May, general Uminski with his division of cavalry (_a_) was ordered to quit the left wing and the position of Zimna-Woda, and to move to the position of Kaluszyn. This traverse of the line he was to make in full view of the enemy, and he was to give to the manoeuvre the aspect of a reconnoissance. The object of this change of position was, that in the new position he might mask the movements of the main body. This important disposition general Uminski was directed to carry into effect with the utmost prudence. The enemy was to be each day harassed, but never to be engaged with in any decisive manner. Small detachments were to be sent against the enemy, along his whole line, and especially on the first days of the movement. The general in chief instructed general Uminski to watch every movement of the enemy, and give information of such at head-quarters. If the main body of the Russian force should make an attack, he was to execute his retreat upon the main road, as far as the fortifications of Praga, and there he was to act in junction with the other detachments left there for the defence of those fortifications. If, on the contrary, the Russian army should make a retrograde movement, general Uminski was to endeavor, by following them, to keep them constantly in view. If circumstances permitted, the rear guard of the Russians might be harassed during the night. Above all, general Uminski was to endeavor to keep up his communications with the neighboring corps, that of general Lubinski, and the detachments left at Siennica and Karczew. In this moderate pursuit of the enemy, the general was to ascertain whether their retrograde movement was a retreat or a manoeuvre, in order to avoid every hazard.