Our army, having halted one day at Xienzopol, on the evening of the 20th, quitted this position to continue the pursuit of the guard, and overtook them in the forest of Menzynin (15). This forest, occupied by the Russian rear-guard, was so near the heights of the village, which command the whole vicinity, that it was exposed to a fire of artillery from these heights. Our generalissimo placed his artillery on the heights, and directed a fire upon the forest; the infantry was ordered to take the enemy in front, in case he should quit the forest, and the cavalry was to advance in strong columns along the road, to cut off his escape from the forest into the road. In this they were successful, and took many prisoners. Thus continually pursued, and subject to severe losses along the whole route, the guard (_l_) was again pressed at the passage of the Narew at Tykocin (16). The consternation and disorder of the enemy was such, that he did not take time to destroy the bridge. Our lancers, commanded by the brave colonel Langerman, commenced an attack upon the Russian cuirassiers, on the bridge itself. The regiment of cuirassiers was almost annihilated, many being thrown from the bridge, and a great number taken prisoners. Having thus driven the Russian guard from the kingdom, (of which the Narew was the boundary,) general Skrzynecki commenced a retrograde movement, to meet the demonstration which general Diebitsch might make upon his rear. On the night of the 22d, our army (_m_) began this movement, having destroyed the several bridges of the Narew. These then are the details of the operations upon the Russian guard, which will be admitted to be among the finest in the history of modern warfare. The operations of Napoleon, in the campaign of Italy--the brilliant commencement of his career, in 1796,--will be always cited as the highest examples of stratago-tactics, but I do not think that a finer and bolder plan of operations can be found even there. In both cases, success was owing, not more to the great military genius of the leaders, than to those high moral impulses which must animate armies in every contest for national existence. Our army, evacuating on the 12th, the position at Kaluszyn, from that date to the 26th, when the battle of Ostrolenka took place, had passed over a distance of from 200 to 250 miles, which, deducting the six days occupied in action, was executed in eight days, making an average of twenty-eight English miles per day, an extraordinary and perhaps unexampled effort. The rapidity, in fact, with which this movement was performed, was such, that our forces were on their return before marshal Diebitsch commenced his march to intercept them. This object the marshal thought himself in season to effect, but the reader will see in the sequel how completely he failed of it. FOOTNOTES: