By this battle the Polish forces had made the acquisition of great advantages, both in respect to strategy and tactics, and the highest hopes might reasonably be cherished in regard to the future. It was, as it were, a return of the state of things brought about by the victory of Iganie, and which menaced the enemy with total ruin. Our main army was then near to Warsaw, composed of a force of considerable strength, and which, under the command of Skrzynecki, had been victorious in every battle. New troops had been formed there. Neither provisions nor forage had failed, for they were constantly sent from Warsaw to the army, in whatever quarter it might be. The Russian army was, in the mean while, suffering under all the disadvantages which we have before described. Wearied and discouraged by the disasters of the campaign, posted in regions which they had devastated, and therefore suffering from scarcity; without hospitals for their sick and their wounded,--for the towns which contained them had been destroyed,--and with the cholera ravaging their ranks, that army was in the most precarious situation. The communications between the Russian provinces and the army were entirely cut off by the Polish Lithuanian corps. They received their provisions exclusively from Prussia; and, but for this assistance of Prussia, no one can doubt that Diebitsch would have been, before this, under the necessity of withdrawing from the country. The reader will also remember that at this time, the brave and skilful general Chrzanowski, had obtained repeated advantages over Rudiger, in the environs of Zamosc, and that the little corps of general Chlapowski which had entered, on the 20th of May, the Russian department of Bialystok, was acting with great advantages. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the provinces of Podolia, Volhynia, Ukraine, as well as Lithuania and Samogitia, containing a population of twelve millions of inhabitants, were in a state of excitement, and would soon have risen in the holy cause. They were waiting only the arrival of our victorious troops. It cannot but be assumed, therefore, that if general Gielgud, at the head of the Polish corps in Lithuania, had acted with promptness and energy, the most happy results would have been achieved. It is, therefore, with the deepest chagrin, that I have to record that from the moment of the termination of the fortunate battle of Raygrod, all the operations of general Gielgud were not only deficient in energy, but altogether wrongly planned. The first fault which he committed, was not continuing to press the attack upon general Saken, after he had retired from Raygrod. Under the pretext that the soldiers were fatigued, the corps was encamped. This pretext was groundless, for the soldiers themselves demanded to be led in pursuit of the enemy. In this camp we passed the whole night, and left it [_Plan_ XXXIII.] at the hour of nine the following morning; having given fifteen hours to the retreating enemy.