History of the Nineteenth Army CorpsIrwin, Richard B. (Richard Biddle)
History
History of the Nineteenth Army Corps
Irwin, Richard B. (Richard Biddle)
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Regimental histories; United States. Army. Corps, 19th
The interval was occupied in continual skirmishes and reconnoissances.
Meanwhile Crook changed over from the left flank to the right at
Summit Point, the cavalry covering the front and flanks from
Snicker's Gap by way of Smithfield and Martinsburg to the Potomac.
On the 16th of September, Grant, pressed by the government in behalf
of the business interests disturbed by the enemy's control of the
railway and the canal, went to Charlestown to confer with Sheridan.
In the breast-pocket of his coat Grant carried a complete plan of
the campaign he meant Sheridan to carry out; but when, having asked
Sheridan if he could be ready to move on Tuesday, Sheridan promptly
answered he should be ready whenever the General should say "Go
in"--at daylight on Monday, if necessary,--so delighted was Grant
that he said not a word about the plan, but contented himself with
echoing the words, "Go in!"
(1) Grover's men made the hard march of 69 miles from Washington
in three days; the last 33 miles in 13½ hours, actual time. See
Major Tiemann's "History of the 159th New York," pp. 91, 92.
CHAPTER XXXII.
THE OPEQUON.(1)
Grant's approval of Sheridan's attack was founded on the withdrawal
of Kershaw; but on the 18th of September, just as Sheridan was
about to move on Newtown, meaning to offer Early the choice of
being turned out of Winchester, or being overwhelmed if he should
stay, news came from Averell that he had been driven out of
Martinsburg by two divisions of infantry. These were the divisions
of Rodes and Gordon, with which, enticed at last into a grave error
by the temptation of hearing that the railway was being repaired,
Early had marched on the 17th to Bunker Hill and Martinsburg. When
Sheridan heard of this, and perceived that Early's forces, already
diminished, were strung along all the way from Winchester to
Martinsburg, he stopped the execution of the orders he had already
issued for the movement at four o'clock in the afternoon of that
day, the 18th of September, and replaced them by fresh arrangements
which led to the battle of the Opequon on the 19th. Since last
moving to the Clifton-Berryville line, Sheridan had used his cavalry
to preserve in his front an open space fully six miles in depth,
extending to the banks of the Opequon, meaning not only to have
the first tidings of any offensive movement by the enemy, but also
that when himself ready to move he might be able to take the enemy
by surprise.
On the evening of the 18th of September, part of Early's cavalry
was at Martinsburg, Gordon occupied Bunker Hill, Wharton was at
Stephenson's, with Rodes closing back on him, while Ramseur alone
covered Winchester in the path of Sheridan's advance. Sheridan
naturally supposed that in a quick movement he would have two
divisions to deal with after crossing the Opequon.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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