The first experiment that was made towards a restriction of the power of the Senate, and an adjustment of its relations to the other departments, was the preparation of a plan, by which the President was to have the making of treaties, and the appointment of ambassadors, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers not otherwise provided for, by and with, the advice and consent of the Senate. The trial of impeachments, of the President included, was transferred to the Senate, and the trial of questions of boundary was placed, like other controversies between States, within the scope of the judicial power. The choice of the President was to be made in the first instance by electors appointed by each State, in such manner as its legislature might direct, each State to have a number of electors equal to the whole number of its senators and representatives in Congress; but if no one of the persons voted for should have a majority of all the electors, or if more than one person should have both a majority and an equal number of votes, the Senate were to choose the President from the five highest candidates voted for by the electors. In this plan, there was certainly a considerable increase of the power of the President; but there was not a sufficient diminution of the power of the Senate. The President could nominate officers and negotiate treaties; but he must obtain the consent of the body by whom he might have been elected, and by whom his re-election might be determined, if he were again to become a candidate. It appeared, therefore, to be quite necessary, either to take away the revisionary control of the Senate over treaties and appointments, or to devise some mode by which the President could be made personally independent of that assembly. He could be made independent only by taking away all agency of the Senate in his election, or by making him ineligible to the office a second time. There were two serious objections to the last of these remedies,--the country might lose the services of a faithful and experienced magistrate, whose continuance in office would be highly important; and even in a case where no pre-eminent merit had challenged a re-election, the effect of an election by the Senate would always be pernicious, and must be visible throughout the whole term of the incumbent who had been successful over four other competitors.