It was undoubtedly the purpose of those who sought for this particular restriction, to qualify the nature of the government, in its relation to the interests of commerce. But the real question was, whether there existed any necessary reason for placing those interests upon a different footing from that of all other subjects of national legislation. The operation of the old rule of the Confederation, which required the assent of nine States in Congress to almost all the important measures of government, many of which involved no fundamental right of separate States, had revealed the inconveniences of lodging in the hands of a minority the power to obstruct just and necessary legislation. If, indeed, it was highly probable that the power, by being left with a majority, would be abused,--if the interests of the Eastern and Middle States were purely and wholly commercial, and would be likely so to shape the legislation of the country as to encourage the growth of its mercantile marine, at the expense of other forms of industry and enterprise, and no other suitable and efficient checks could be found,--then the restriction proposed might be proper and necessary. But in truth the separate interests of the Eastern and Middle States, when closely viewed, were not in all respects the same. Connecticut and New Jersey were agricultural States. New York and Pennsylvania, although interested in maritime commerce, were destined to be great producers of the most important grains. Maryland, although a commercial, was also an agricultural State. The new States likely to be formed in the West would be almost wholly agricultural, and would have no more shipping than might be required to move the surplus products of their soil upon their great inland lakes towards the shores of the Atlantic. All these States, existing and expectant, were interested to obtain commercial treaties with foreign countries; all needed the benefits of uniform commercial regulations; but they were not all equally interested in a high degree of encouragement to the growth of American shipping, by means of a stringent navigation act, that would bear heavily upon the Southern planter. Not only was there a very considerable protection against the abuse of its power by a sectional majority, in these more minute diversities of interest, but there were also two very efficient legislative checks upon that power already introduced into the government. If an unjust and oppressive measure had commanded a majority in the House, it might be defeated in the Senate, or, if that check should fail, it might be arrested by the executive.