[311] The Constitution, Art. VI. (See Appendix.) [312] July 17. Elliot, V. 322. [313] The Constitution. Art. VI. [314] Ibid. Art. III. § 2. [315] Articles XXI., XXII., XXIII. of their draft. Elliot, V. 381. [316] The Constitution, Art. VII. [317] _Ante_, p. 177, _et seq._ The resolutions may be found in Elliot, V. 541 (Sept. 13). But the proceedings on them are not found in Mr. Madison's Minutes, or in the Journal of the Convention. The official record of their unanimous adoption was laid before Congress on the 28th of September, 1787, and it bears date September 17th. It recites the presence in Convention of all the states that attended excepting New York, and in the place of that _State_ stands "Mr. Hamilton _from_ New York." This record precedes the official letter addressed by the Convention to Congress. See Journals of Congress for September 28, 1787, Vol. XII. pp. 149-165. [318] See a speech made by Hamilton in the Convention of New York. Works, II. 462. [319] 4 Blackstone's Com., Book IV. ch. 6. [320] Art. VI. § 2 of the first draft of the Constitution. Elliot, V. 379. [321] Elliot, V. 450. [322] The effect of these words is as if the statute read "adhering to the enemy _by_ giving him aid and comfort," and not as if they were two separate offences. [323] See the debate, Elliot, V. 447-451. [324] Ibid. Art. III. § 3 of the Constitution. CHAPTER XIII. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--ELECTION AND POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT. In describing the manner in which the Constitution and powers of the Senate were finally arranged, I have already had occasion to state, that, after the report of the committee of detail came in,--vesting the appointment of the President in the national legislature, creating a term of seven years, and making the incumbent ineligible a second time,--a direct election by the people was negatived by a large majority. This mode of election, as a means of removing the appointment from the legislature, would have been successful, but it was inadmissible on other accounts. In the first place, it would have given to the government a character of complete consolidation, so far as the executive department was concerned, to have vested the election in the people of the United States as one community. In the second place, not only would the States, as sovereignties, have been excluded from representation in this department, but the slaveholding States would have had a relative weight in the election only in the proportion of their free inhabitants. On the other hand, to provide that the executive should be appointed by electors, to be chosen by the people of the States, involved the necessity of prescribing some rule of suffrage for the people of all the States, or of adopting the existing rules of the States themselves. Probably it was on account of this embarrassment, that a proposition for electors to be chosen in this mode was negatived, by a bare majority, soon after the vote