History of the Peninsular War, Volume 1 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 1 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Admirable as this address is, one grievous error was committed in
it, the precursor of others, and in itself of the most dangerous and
fatal tendency. It was said, “that the number of the enemy’s troops
was not so great as the French stated with a view of intimidating
the Spaniards; and that the positions which they had taken were
exactly those in which they could be conquered and defeated in the
easiest manner.” Whatever momentary advantage might be hoped for
by thus deceiving the people as to the extent of their danger, was
sure to be counterbalanced tenfold whenever they were undeceived, as
inevitably they would be. This error was the more remarkable, because
they were well aware of the enemy’s strength, and perceived also in
what manner it was to be opposed with the greatest probability of
success. For this purpose they strenuously recommended in an address
concerning the conduct of the war, that all general actions should be
avoided as perfectly hopeless, and in the highest degree dangerous.
A war of partizans was the system which suited them; their business
should be incessantly to harass the enemy; for which species of
warfare the nature of the country was particularly favourable. It was
indispensable, they said, that each province should have its general;
but, as nothing could be done without a combined plan, it was equally
indispensable that there should be three generalissimos, one commanding
in Andalusia, Murcia, and Lower Estremadura; one in Gallicia, Upper
Estremadura, the Castilles, and Leon; one in Valencia, Aragon, and
Catalonia. These generalissimos should keep up a frequent communication
with each other, and with the provincial generals, that they might
act by common accord, and assist each other. A particular general
was required for the provinces of Madrid and La Mancha, whose only
object should be to distress the enemy, to cut off their provisions,
to harass them in flank and in rear, and not leave them a moment of
repose. Another generalissimo was necessary for Navarre, the Biscayan
provinces, Asturias, Rioja, and the north of Old Castille; this being
the most important station of all. His whole business should be to
prevent the entrance of French troops into Spain, and to cut off the
retreat of those who were flying out of it. It was recommended that
frequent proclamations should be issued, showing the people that it was
better to die in defence of their liberties than to give themselves
up like sheep, as their late infamous government would have done.
“France,” said they, “has never domineered over us, nor set foot in
our territory. We have many times mastered her, not by deceit but by
force of arms. We have made her kings prisoners, and we have made the
nation tremble. We are the same Spaniards; and France, and Europe, and
the world, shall see that we have not degenerated from our ancestors.”
They were also exhorted watchfully to confute the falsehoods which the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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