History of the Peninsular War, Volume 2 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 2 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
As this was, in fact, delivering no opinion at all, the board was
called upon, by the Duke of York, as commander-in-chief, to resume its
consideration of the armistice and convention, and pronounce decidedly
whether they thought them adviseable. The armistice was disapproved
by Earl Moira; the convention by the same nobleman, by the Earl of
Pembroke, and General Nicolls: thus, six of the seven members approved
the armistice, and four approved the convention. The dissentient
members delivered in their reasons for the opinion which they gave.
General Nicolls and Earl Pembroke confined themselves to a military
point of view. Earl Moira took a wider scope, and argued ably against
the moral and political effects of the treaty. The proceedings ♦JAN.
18, 1809.♦ were concluded by a declaration from the King, adopting
the unanimous opinion of the board, that no farther proceeding was
necessary; but expressing his disapprobation of those articles of
the convention in which stipulations were made, directly affecting
the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portugueze nations. That
disapprobation his Majesty had signified to Sir Hew Dalrymple when
the treaty was first laid before him, and he repeated it, deeming it
necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the
impropriety and danger of the unauthorised admission, into military
conventions, of articles of such a description. Nor could he forbear
observing, that Sir Hew’s delaying to transmit the armistice concluded
on the 22d of August, till the 4th of September, when the ratified
convention was transmitted at the same time, was calculated to produce
great public inconvenience, and that such inconvenience had, in fact,
resulted therefrom. The King abstained from any observations upon other
parts of the convention.
Thus the whole censure fell upon Sir Hew Dalrymple. But it was seen
by the people that the great error of judgement had been committed
at home, in not providing that the General by whom the campaign was
planned should carry it to the end. And how often may it be observed
in history, as in private life, that the course of events is better
directed to the end desired, than if the persons most interested in the
success could themselves have ordered it! So it was in this campaign,
which at the time so severely disappointed the nation. A more splendid
triumph might have been obtained in the field, a higher tone might
have been taken in the negotiation; but in either of these cases
Almeida and Elvas would have been left in possession of the enemy; and
whatever efforts might have been made for reducing them, they could
easily have held out till the dispersion of the Spanish armies. It
would then have been a great object with the French to relieve the
garrisons, and this would have brought them to Lisbon at a time when
there were neither preparations nor means for resistance there.
CHAPTER XII.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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