error seems to have been committed less from want of judgement than in deference to the provincial Juntas, and in fear of offending them; yet at that time public opinion would have supported them had they appointed Castaños commander-in-chief. ♦DIFFICULTY OF FEEDING THEIR ARMIES.♦ It was not, however, the abilities of any single general, however pre-eminent, which could have saved the Spanish armies, constituted as they then were, from inevitable defeat, unless a strong British force had been ready to have acted with them. Preparations upon an adequate scale had been promised and intended by the Central Government; but when they had raised men and embodied them, the difficulty of maintaining them occurred, a difficulty which has at all times been greater in Spain than in any other civilized country. Our own commissariat was then far from effective; for great experience, as well as great activity and talents, are required in the business of providing an army: it is not then to be wondered at that the Spaniards, under their complicated embarrassments, should have been grievously defective in this main branch of the military art; but this was one cause why the number of their armies fell far short of their computed force, many young recruits returning to their homes, when they saw how miserably they fared in the camp. It would have been most desirable to have followed up the first successes with vigour, and have attacked the enemy while the impression made upon them by so many humiliating failures was fresh, and before farther reinforcements should enable them to resume the offensive. But this had not been possible. The French were strongly posted, and well provided with all the means of war; and their cavalry gave them complete command of the plains of Castille. They had ravaged the land from Burgos to Astorga, and driven in contributions from the very gates of the latter city. Blake could oppose no resistance to them in that open country without cavalry, and for want of that essential arm was obliged to alter his intended plan of operations, and pursue, at considerable risk, a different course. He resolved to take a position between Bilbao and Vitoria, and menace the right flank and rear of the French, while the army of Aragon should act on their left. ♦BILBAO TAKEN AND RETAKEN. SEPT. 20.♦