History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
When the Central Junta were informed of these movements, they imputed
the disastrous measure to Henestrosa’s abandonment of his post, and
ordered Cuesta to proceed against him with all the rigour of the law.
But the old General, though disposed at first to condemn him, was too
generous to do this. He replied that the Camp-Marshal had in all other
cases behaved well, and with a courage amounting to rashness, and that
in this he had acted only under an error of judgement. He met with no
enemies on his night march, and halting in the morning beyond the Rio
Monte, learnt that the detachment which he had expected to encounter
was taking a direction for Truxillo. To Truxillo he proceeded on his
retreat, and, leaving Henestrosa to cover that city, took up a position
at the Puerto de Santa Cruz, forty miles from the stronger pass whence
he had retreated. There it was his intention to wait till it should
be seen whether Alburquerque’s division could effect its junction,
and whether it ♦MARCH 20.♦ would make him equal to the enemy. On the
following morning Henestrosa was attacked, and driven to a little
bridge on the other side of Truxillo: there he repulsed the enemy, and
the skirmishing continued all day, with equal loss on either side,
the Spaniards behaving in such a manner as to increase the General’s
confidence in his troops. Cuesta expected now to be attacked on the
morrow, either in front or on his left toward the village of Abertura,
and had made up his mind to abide an action. But Cuesta’s resolutions
were sometimes changed with as little consideration as they had been
taken, for he was a man who acted more frequently upon the impulse
of the moment than upon reflection. The whole of Victor’s force was
collected at Truxillo; his advanced parties kept the Spaniards upon
the alarm as well as the alert, and Cuesta then began to apprehend
that the Puerto de S. Cruz was not defensible against the superior
force that would be brought against him, especially as the ground was
not favourable for cavalry. In the morning, therefore, he recommenced
his retreat, evidently not knowing whither, and with no determined
purpose, but in good order and in good heart, for, injudicious and
ruinous as all the late movements had been, the men were not yet
dispirited. While he was halting near Miajadas to refresh the troops,
the _chasseurs_ of the enemy’s advanced guard approached near enough to
expose themselves; the advantage was well taken, and the French Colonel
tore his hair in an agony of grief when he saw some hundred and fifty
of his ♦ROCCA, 93.♦ finest men cut down. This success was obtained by
the regiments of Infante and Almanza. It raised the spirits of the men,
a feeling of useful emulation was showing itself, and Cuesta formed the
wise resolution (if he had been steady enough in his purposes to have
kept it) of exercising them in various movements from one position to
another, without exposing them in battle, and thus detaining the enemy
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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