Three circumstances had materially contributed to the success of the Galicians: the aid and confidence which they derived from the British ships, whereby they were assisted first in recovering Vigo, and afterwards at the bridge of S. Payo; the rare virtues of Romana, whose single thought was how to serve his country, and who for that object, shrinking neither from responsibility nor obloquy, acted always with promptitude and decision upon his own judgement; and, lastly, the very condition, or rather destitution of his army: its name and presence had a powerful effect in rousing and encouraging the people, while the troops themselves felt and understood their utter inability for any other mode of warfare than that which their leader was pursuing, and thus derived strength from the very knowledge of their weakness. In Catalonia the people were not less brave and patriotic; there was a stronger British squadron off the coast; and the army was respectable for numbers, sufficiently equipped, and in a state of discipline not to be despised. But the Generals in succession were deficient either in military skill or natural talent, or that vigour of mind without which all other qualifications in a commander are of no avail. ♦PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH AFTER THE FALL OF ZARAGOZA.♦ Neither in Aragon nor in Catalonia had the French been able to follow up their success. They had paid dearly for Zaragoza: even the army of observation had been so harassed during that ever-memorable siege, that it was necessary to allow them some repose. Having possessed themselves of Jaca by the treachery of the governor, and of Monzon, which was evacuated by the garrison because Lazan had taken no effectual measures for supplying it with provisions; they were repulsed in three attempts upon Mequinenza. They summoned Lerida, thinking to intimidate the inhabitants by the fate of the Zaragozans; but that example had produced an effect which neither Buonaparte nor his Generals were capable of anticipating; they estimated every thing by success, and with them to be unfortunate was to be despised and miserable. Marshal Lasnes was told in answer to his summons, that Zaragoza, unprotected as it was, had held out ten months against its besiegers, and that Lerida was a strong place. The Spaniards were also reminded that the Prince of Condé had been baffled before that fortress. It was expected by some of the Spanish officers that St. Cyr, in conjunction with the French from Aragon, would besiege the city without delay; that he would afterwards attack Tarragona, and then, marching from conquest to conquest, proceed against Valencia. Others ♦CABAÑES, C. 14.♦ supposed, that for the more immediate object of securing the communication between France and Barcelona, his first measure would be to get possession of Hostalrich. Orders were indeed sent to St. Cyr to undertake with his corps the ♦ST. CYR, 130.♦ sieges of Gerona, Tarragona, and Tortosa, at the same