By this path, on the 15th, the French succeeded in passing Hostalrich; they started at daybreak, and had just regained the high road when the garrison, having discovered the way which they had taken, came out and annoyed their rear. In the course of the day they lost about two hundred men by repeated attacks of the Miquelets: and the troops, harassed by these skirmishes and by a fatiguing march, in which they had to cross many torrents, would fain have halted for the night when they arrived at Puente de la Tordera. The defile of Treinta-pasos was before them six miles in length, and St. Cyr knew that if they did not pass it that night, they must fight their way through on the morrow. He urged them forward therefore, leaving a handful of men at the entrance, to keep the Miquelets in check. The Spaniards had endeavoured to impede the way by breaking up the road and felling trees across it: but they had neglected to occupy this important pass, and by eleven o’clock the whole of the French ♦ST. CYR, 52–63.♦ army bivouacqued on the plain a league from Llinas. ♦INDECISION OF GENERAL VIVES.♦ General Vives, during the whole time that the French were before Rosas, had been occupied with the insane purpose of laying regular siege to Barcelona. From this dream he was disturbed by advices from Gerona that the firing at Rosas had ceased; and any hope which might have remained was soon put an end to by certain intelligence of its surrender from the British squadron. The Spanish Commander had taken none of the ordinary means for obtaining information of the enemy’s movements; he knew as little of their strength as of their plans: he was ill acquainted with the country, and the persons by whom he was surrounded were utterly ignorant of military affairs, and might have perplexed a firmer spirit and a clearer understanding, by their contrarious and vacillating counsels. It was a moment at which a blow might have been struck not less momentous than the battle of Baylen; for the destruction of St. Cyr’s army (and destruction must have been the consequence of defeat) would have drawn after it the recovery of Barcelona and Figueras, and effectual assistance might then have been afforded to Zaragoza. But the unreasonable hopes which he had long indulged were followed by an ominous prostration of mind. Fretted as well as embarrassed by want of money; alarmed by tidings of the rout at Tudela, and of the appearance of the enemy again before Zaragoza; still more alarmed by receiving no advices from the side of Madrid, and therefore with too much reason apprehending the worst, he had no government to look to for orders, no reliance upon others, and none ♦DEC. 11.♦ upon himself. Four days were wasted in hopeless indecision; then came intelligence at midnight from the Junta at Gerona that St. Cyr was on his march, and, having sent his artillery to Figueras, it was evident that Barcelona was his object. Immediately General Reding