was dispatched with his division, consisting of about 4000 men, to oppose him. Succeeding advices left no doubt of the direction of the French; a council of war was held; Caldagues was of ♦HE MARCHES AGAINST THE FRENCH.♦ opinion that the General should march against the enemy with the greater part of his force, leaving only enough to keep up the blockade: he took however not more than 5000 with him, and, having dispatched instructions to the Marques de Lazan, followed Reding, and having ♦DEC. 15. CABAÑES, P. 9. C. II.♦ joined him at Granollers, set out from that place at midnight just when the French had passed without opposition through the defile of Treinta-pasos: the Spaniards as they left Granollers saw the fires of the enemy’s bivouac. ♦ROUT OF THE SPANIARDS AT LLINAS.♦ The intention was to occupy an advantageous position between Villalba and Llinas: the artillery and the want of order in some of the raw troops impeded their march; it was morning when the head of the column arrived at Cardedeu, and before Vives could reach the ground which he had intended to take he came in sight of the enemy, and his men, after a night march of eight hours, had to draw up for battle. The French were refreshed by rest: but they had consumed their biscuit, and so much of their ammunition had been expended in skirmishing with the Miquelets, that what remained would not have been sufficient for an hour in action. St. Cyr had formed them in one column at daybreak. When the Spanish artillery began to play upon the head of that column, Pino, of whose division it was composed, sent an aide-de-camp, to ask if any change was to be made in the dispositions for battle. St. Cyr’s reply was, “We have neither time nor means to make dispositions. In this covered country it would take at least three hours to reconnoitre the enemy well, ... in less than two, Lazan might arrive to attack us in the rear, and Milans might fall upon our left. We have not a minute to lose; but must bring our whole force to bear upon the centre of their line.” Notwithstanding these orders, the first brigade deployed, and attacking the left of Reding’s division suffered considerably, and began to give way. St. Cyr, when he saw his orders disobeyed, instructed Pino to execute his original plan with the second brigade, and, changing the direction of Souham’s division, sent it to turn General Reding’s right. Two battalions were ordered to make a false attack upon the left of the Spanish position. Here the rout began. The centre was forced at the same time; and Vives and his staff, seeing all hope lost on that side, hastened to the right, where the advantage had hitherto appeared to be with Reding. But they carried panic with them; Souham’s division decided the battle in that quarter with equal celerity, and the steadiness with which some of the old troops behaved was not supported well enough to save the Spaniards from a total and scandalous defeat. It was eight o’clock when they formed for action,