Garay’s answer closed the discussion. It was meant to be at the same time conciliatory, and capable of being produced for the exculpation of the Junta. He represented, “that if any immediate attack upon Cadiz was to be feared, ... if the Spanish forces were incapable of defending that point, ... if there were no others of the greatest importance where the enemy might be opposed with advantage, the Junta would not fear to hurt the public feeling by admitting foreign troops into that fortress, because public feeling would then be actuated by the existing state of things. But no such emergency existed; the armies were strengthening themselves in points very distant from Cadiz; the enemy had much ground to pass, and many difficulties to conquer, before he could threaten it; time could never be wanted for falling back upon that fortress; it was easy to be defended, ... it was to be considered as a last point of retreat, and extreme points ought to be defended in advance, never in themselves, except in cases of extreme urgency. The army of Extremadura defended Andalusia on that side, those of the centre and La Carolina at the Sierra Morena; the enemy for some time past had not been able to make any progress; and there if superior forces could be collected against him, a decisive blow might be struck. Catalonia too was bravely defending itself, and Zaragoza still resisted the repeated attacks of an obstinate and persevering besieger. Either in Extremadura, or with the central army or in Catalonia, the assistance of Great Britain would be of infinite service. This was the opinion of the Junta; this was the opinion of the whole nation, and would doubtless be that of every one who contemplated the true state of things. If the auxiliary troops already in the bay, or on their passage, should disembark in the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and proceed to reinforce General Cuesta, they would always find a safe retreat in Cadiz in case of any reverse; but should a body of troops, already very small, leave part of its force in Cadiz, in order to secure a retreat at such a distance, the English ambassador himself must acknowledge that such assistance could inspire the Spaniards with very little confidence, particularly after the events in Galicia. But it appeared to Mr. Frere that the presence of these troops was necessary at Lisbon, and therefore he had given orders for their return. Of this measure the same might be said as of the proposed one for securing Cadiz. Lisbon was not the point where Portugal could be defended; the greatest possible number of troops ought to be employed in those advanced lines where the enemy was posted, and where he might be routed decisively. For all these reasons the Supreme Junta were persuaded, that if the British government should determine that its troops should not act in union with theirs, except on the expressed condition, this non-co-operation could never be imputed to them. The Junta must act