History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Lord Wellington had foreseen this, and clearly perceiving also what
would be the business of the ensuing campaign, had prepared for the
defence of Portugal in time. It was necessary that we should carry on
the war in that country as principals rather than as allies, and for
this full power had been given by the Prince of Brazil. As yet little
had been done toward the improvement of the Portugueze army; like the
government, it was in the worst possible condition; both were in the
lowest state of degradation to which ignorance, and imbecility, and
inveterate abuses ♦MONEY VOTED FOR THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY.♦ could reduce
them. Early in the session, parliament was informed that the King had
authorized pecuniary advances to be made to Portugal, in support of its
military exertions, and had made an arrangement for the maintenance of
a body of troops not exceeding 30,000 men. Twenty thousand we already
had in our pay, the sum for whom was estimated at 600,000_l._; for
the additional ten, it was stated at 250,000_l._ to which was to be
added 130,000_l._ for the maintenance of officers to be employed in
training these levies, and preparing them to act with the British
troops. This led to a very interesting ♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY;♦ debate in
the House of Lords. Marquis Wellesley affirmed, “that Portugal was
the most material military position that could be occupied for the
purpose of assisting Spain: great disasters, he admitted, had befallen
the Spanish cause, still they were far from sinking his mind into
despair, and still he would contend, it was neither politic nor just
to manifest any intention ♦1810. FEBRUARY.♦ of abandoning Portugal.
What advantage could be derived from casting over our own councils,
and over the hopes of Portugal and Spain, the hue and complexion of
despair? To tell them that the hour of their fate was arrived, ...
that all attempts to assist, or even to inspirit their exertions in
their own defence, were of no avail, ... that they must bow the neck
and submit to the yoke of a merciless invader, ... this indeed would
be to strew the conqueror’s path with flowers, to prepare the way for
his triumphal march to the throne of the two kingdoms! Was it then
for this that so much treasure had been expended, ... that so much of
the blood had been shed of those gallant and loyal nations? Whatever
disasters had befallen them, they were not imputable to the people of
Spain. The spirit of the people was excellent, and he still ventured to
hope that it would prove unconquerable. All their defeats and disasters
were solely to be ascribed to the vices of their government. It was the
imbecility, or treachery, of that vile and wretched government which
first opened the breach through which the enemy entered into the heart
of Spain; that delivered into hostile hands the fortresses of that
country; and betrayed her people defenceless and unarmed into the power
of a perfidious foe. Let us not contribute to accomplish what they have
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