History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
the army, its strength, the formation of its magazines, preparations
for cutting down or blowing up bridges, &c., they would at least tell
their correspondents not to publish these letters in newspapers, unless
it was certain that the publication could not prove injurious to the
army and to the public service.”
♦APPREHENSIONS EXPRESSED IN ENGLAND.♦
There was cause for this reproof. The effect of such agueish
predictions in Portugal could only be to make the Portugueze believe
we should forsake them, and thus dispose them for submission to the
enemy; while, in England, they assisted the party of the despondents,
whose journalists were labouring to strike their country with a dead
palsy. “We had been lulled,” they said, “into the most dangerous
confidence. Massena was only waiting for the advance of his flanks,
that he might, with his whole combined army, either force our handful
of men to a battle, or surround them: all that could be expected was,
that the survivors might be enabled to retire to their ships with
eclat.” By the next dispatches it appeared, that it was more easy
for a journalist to imagine such a manœuvre, than for Massena to
execute it; but this had no other effect than to make them change the
note of alarm. “If Massena,” they then said, “did not destroy Lord
Wellington’s army by fighting, it could only be because he meant
to destroy it by not fighting; for Massena was the most consummate
captain of all Buonaparte’s generals. And did ministers anticipate with
complacency the continuance of our army in Portugal through the winter?
The rainy season was approaching; might it not be the deep policy of
this arch-statesman and conqueror to keep our army there? He would be
content to devote Massena and his troops to destruction, if it would
facilitate some ulterior plan; he might mean to ruin us by the expense
of our forces there; and what should we say, if it were really a part
of his policy to keep them there, while he, having possession of the
Dutch, the Danish, and the Swedish fleets and ports, made a descent
upon England or Ireland? They trusted ministers were upon their guard,
and that they destined their troops at home for a service more imminent
than the reinforcement of Lord Wellington.”
♦NEY SUMMONS THE GOVERNOR OF ALMEIDA.♦
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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