History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
No person acquainted
with the real condition of the British and Spanish forces at ♦AUG. 30.♦
this time, could reasonably advise a forward movement against the enemy
with any other view than the certain destruction of the allied armies.”
♦HIS ILL OPINION OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.♦
The conduct of the Junta gave strong grounds for such a suspicion.
The real cause which had checked the progress of a victorious army,
and finally reduced it to a state unfit for service, could not be
concealed; public opinion loudly imputed this evil to the negligence of
government, and the government endeavoured, by ungenerous artifices, to
divert the general indignation. Rumours were set afloat that the real
cause of the retreat of the British army was very different from the
assigned one; they had not fallen back upon Portugal because there had
been any deficiency either in their means of supply or of transport,
but because of certain political considerations, inconsistent with the
security and honour of Spain, and with the good faith of Great Britain.
Demands, it was whispered, had been made in the King of England’s
name, for the cession of Cadiz, of the Havannah, and even of the whole
island of Cuba; changes had been required in the form of the Spanish
government, as preliminary conditions to the further operations of the
British troops in Spain, and Lord Wellington had retreated only because
these demands were refused. These reports, which, if not invented
by the government, certainly were not discountenanced by them, were
absolutely and entirely false; nothing had been asked from Spain except
subsistence for the army employed in her defence. Marquis Wellesley,
however, though he perceived the criminal misconduct of the government,
and though he affirmed that in the last campaign no rational motives
could be imagined for the conduct of some of the generals and officers,
unless it were supposed that they concerted their operations with the
French instead of the British general, did justice to the people of
Spain. “Whatever insincerity or jealousy towards England existed, was
to be found,” he said, “in the government, its officers, and adherents;
no such unworthy sentiment prevailed among the people.” They had done
their duty, and were still ready to do it; and, notwithstanding the
vexations which he experienced, and the alarm and even ill-will which
the retreat of the British excited, he remembered, as became him,
that the cause of Spain and England was the same: while, therefore,
he expressed his opinion that the Cortes ought to be assembled, and
a more efficient government formed than that of so ill-constituted
and anomalous a body as the Junta, he listened willingly to every
suggestion for employing the British troops in any practicable manner.
Might it not be possible, it was said, for them to take up a position
on the left bank of the Guadiana, occupying Merida as an advanced post,
their right at Almendralejo, and their left extending toward Badajoz?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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