History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Among the persons who became most eminent for their exploits in
this desultory warfare, D. Julian Sanchez began at this time to be
distinguished. He raised a company of lancers in ♦1809. OCTOBER.♦ the
district of Ciudad Rodrigo, and acted with such effect against the
enemy in the plains of Castille, that General Marchand, who commanded
the sixth corps at Salamanca, threatened to execute the vengeance which
the guerillas at once eluded and defied, upon those whom he suspected
of favouring them. Specifying, therefore, eight of the principal
sheep-owners in that part of the country, he declared that they should
be kept under a military guard in their own houses, and the severest
measures be enforced against their persons and property, if the bands
of robbers, as he called them, did not totally disappear within eight
days after the date of his proclamation. He declared also that the
priests, _alcaldes_, lawyers, and surgeons of every village, should
be responsible with their lives for any disorders committed by the
guerillas within their respective parishes; adding, that every village
and every house which the inhabitants might abandon on the approach of
the French should be burnt. This served only to call forth an indignant
reply from Sanchez, containing some of those incontrovertible truths
which made the better part of the French themselves detest the service
in which they were employed.
Ney’s corps was at this time in Salamanca, under General Marchand,
occupying also Ledesma and Alba de Tormes. Soult’s head-quarters were
at Plasencia; he occupied Coria, Galesteo, and the banks of the Tietar
and the Tagus, as far as the Puente del Arzobispo; Mortier’s corps was
at Talavera, Oropesa, La Calzada de Oropesa, and Naval Moral; Victor’s
advanced posts were at Daymiel, his head-quarters at Toledo; Sebastiani
was at Fuenlebrada, and his corps extended from Aranjuez to Alcala. On
the side of La Mancha or Extremadura, they could not hope to open a way
to Seville, unless the government by an act of suicidal madness should
encounter the certain consequences ♦THE FRENCH REPULSED FROM ASTORGA.♦
of a general action. Remaining, therefore, on the defensive here, they
prepared for offensive operations on the side of Salamanca, with a view
to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and a third invasion of Portugal. Sir
Robert Wilson’s representations respecting the importance of that point
had not been neglected by the government; the force which the Duque del
Parque commanded there was now respectable in numbers, and had acquired
some experience as well as confidence in that desultory warfare
which Sir Robert had begun, and which D. Julian Sanchez had so well
continued. Preparatory to their movements on this quarter, the French
attempted to carry Astorga by a sudden attack, for which purpose, with
a force of 2600 men, they advanced from the Ezla, and endeavoured to
force the Bishop’s Gate. D. Jose Maria de Santocildes, who commanded
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