The first information of his purpose came through a channel which was entitled to so little credit, that it seems to have obtained none. On the evening of the first of March, a Portugueze boy was apprehended in Abrantes with articles of provision, which were with reason suspected to be for an enemy, because the boy was not ready with an answer when he was asked for whom he was catering. Being carried before the governor, he confessed that he was servant to the commanding officer of a French regiment, who had sent him to purchase these things, because the army was about to return to the north of Portugal. The next day, ♦MARCH.♦ he added, Massena would review the troops on the south of the Zezere, and the retreat would commence on the evening of the fifth. That a boy in such a situation should have acquired this knowledge, is a remarkable proof of his sagacity, and of the indiscretion of the officer from whom he must have obtained it; for it was verified in all its parts. Such a movement was, however, so probable, that it had for some days been expected. The first apparent indication of it was given by the French setting fire to their workshops, stores, and bridge-materials at Punhete, on the 3rd. They had previously been sending the heavy artillery, the baggage, and the sick to the rear. On the 4th, transports with 7000 British troops on board anchored in the Tagus; and that same day the enemy’s advanced corps withdrew from Santarem. Lieutenant Claxton, who commanded the gun-boats appointed to co-operate with the troops in Alentejo, saw them departing, as he was reconnoitring under that city. No time was lost in occupying it by the allies; and when it was seen how the natural advantages of that position had been improved by all the resources of military skill, Lord Wellington’s prudence in waiting till time and hunger had done his work was acknowledged by those who before had been inclined to censure him for inactivity and want of enterprise. The opportunity which he had so long desired, and so anxiously expected, had now arrived; and in the sure confidence of intellectual power, he saw that the deliverance of the Peninsula might be secured in that campaign, if Badajoz were defended as it might and ought to be. No sooner, therefore, had it been ascertained that the enemy was retreating, than he despatched the intelligence to Elvas, desiring the commander to communicate it to the governor of Badajoz, assuring him that he should speedily be succoured, and urging him, in reliance upon that assurance, to defend the fortress to the last extremity. That intelligence was despatched on the 6th. General Imaz received it on the 9th. The next day a breach was made, and Mortier summoned him ♦BADAJOZ SURRENDERED.♦ to surrender. The garrison at this time consisted of 7500 effective men: the townsmen might have been made effective also; provisions and ammunition were in abundance; and the intelligence which Lord Wellington received from