History of the Peninsular War, Volume 5 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 5 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Soult affected to regret that a general action had not been brought on.
He magnified the merit of the defence of Badajoz, saying, that it would
be cited in military history as one of the most memorable exploits
of its kind; and he magnified the importance of the junction of the
two armies on the Guadiana, calling it one of the most marked events
of the war in Spain. This general had a more than common interest
in blazoning forth a success which covered his late defeat. “Thus,”
said he, “the signal victory which was gained at Albuhera has been
ascertained in favour of the imperial army: the main object which I had
in view was then accomplished, that of making a diversion in favour of
Badajoz, and enabling that fortress to prolong its resistance. It is
now evident that the battle of Albuhera gained us at least twenty days,
during which we were enabled to make arrangements for bringing up new
reinforcements, and the army of Portugal was able to take part in the
operations: thus the second object which I had in view in making my
first movement has been also accomplished; and the troops which fought
at Albuhera have not ceased a single day to act upon the offensive
against the enemy.” Beyond all doubt Marshal Soult was one of the
ablest generals of his age: his operations at this time were ultimately
successful, but his earnestness to prove that he had gained a victory
at Albuhera only shows how deeply he felt the defeat.
The French government were elated with an advantage which came
seasonably after the various disgraces that the French arms had
suffered in the Peninsula. “The English,” said they, “are again to
learn, and by a mighty thunderbolt ... (the raising of the siege of
Badajoz is a presage of it), that they cannot with impunity leave the
element of which they have usurped the empire.” The English, however,
had long been accustomed to hear of these thunderbolts, and to defy
the more tangible weapons of the enemy. Soult said, in his official
account, “that they appeared to have given us Spain entirely, and
to be concentrating themselves for the defence of Lisbon: they felt
their inability to support the contest; and every thing,” he added,
“induced him to think that when the army of reserve should have arrived
upon Almeida, they would feel the impossibility even of maintaining
themselves at Lisbon.” While the enemy threw out these boastful
anticipations, Lord Wellington remained in his position, watching their
movements, and certain that they could not long subsist the force which
they had brought together.
♦BLAKE’S MOVEMENTS.♦
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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