History of the Peninsular War, Volume 5 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 5 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
He had made himself, however, already so far master of the field, as
to continue his operations against Murviedro without interruption.
Oropesa surrendered on the 11th, after a cannonade of a few hours;
Captain Eyre, in the Magnificent, had just arrived to assist it, but
he came only in time to bring off the garrison of a tower about a mile
distant. Artillery and tools could now be safely brought from Tortosa;
and a week afterwards a practicable breach was effected. Twice in the
course of a day and ♦OCT. 11.♦ night the French attempted to storm it,
and were repulsed with great slaughter. The fort, though, according
to the inveterate habit of procrastination which has for centuries
been the reproach of Spanish policy, its works were incomplete, yet
was capable of ♦A SECOND ASSAULT REPELLED.♦ making a very formidable
resistance; for it was so constructed as to form four parts, each of
which might be defended after the others were taken. Blake calculated
upon the impetuosity of the enemy, the steadiness of the garrison, and
the patriotism of the governor; the two former did not deceive him: and
he had laid down for himself a wise plan of operations; which was to
abstain from battle, in hope that the French would weaken themselves in
the siege, and might be compelled to retreat by movements upon their
flank and on the side of Aragon.
♦GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN AID OF MURVIEDRO.♦
It was part of this plan to surprise the French in Cuenca, and thus
cut off Suchet’s communication with Madrid: this expedition was
committed to General Mahy, with whom the Conde de Montijo was to
co-operate. The attempt proved ineffectual, and Mahy returned with
his division to join the commander-in-chief. In Aragon the Spaniards
were led by men of a different stamp, and their movements would have
led to very different results, if the spirit of provincialism, and
that insubordination which long habits of military independence can
scarcely fail to produce, had not frustrated fair beginnings, and
bright prospects of success. A decree of the Cortes had attached the
guerrilla parties to the armies of their respective districts, and
given rank to their leaders, leaving them to pursue their own system
of warfare at their own discretion, but subjecting them thus to a
military superior whenever they should be called upon. By virtue of
this decree, Duran and the Empecinado, who commanded, the one in Soria,
the other in Guadalaxara, each with the rank of brigadier, had been
ordered by Blake to unite and enter Aragon, which Suchet had drained of
troops for his expedition against Valencia. It was not easy to bring
these irregular companies under any restraint of discipline: the Junta
of Guadalaxara were not willing to part with the Empecinado’s band;
the men themselves were not willing to leave what they considered as
their own district; disputes broke out ♦DISPERSION OF THE EMPECINADO’S
TROOPS.♦ among them when their leader was not present; they turned
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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