History of the Peninsular War, Volume 5 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 5 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The decree, by which the Regents were declared responsible, produced
a memorial from them, requesting to know what were the obligations
annexed to that responsibility, and what the specific powers which
were given them; “unless these things,” they said, “were clearly and
distinctly determined, the Regency would not know how to act, inasmuch
as the ancient laws had drawn no line of distinction between the two
powers; and thus they must be continually in danger, on the one hand,
of exerting an authority, which, in the opinion of the Cortes, might
not be included in the attributes of the executive, or, on the other,
of omitting to exert the powers which it involves, and which at this
time were more necessary than ever.” The reply of the Cortes proved
with how little forethought they had passed their decree. “They had not
limited,” they said, “the proper faculties of the executive, and the
Regency was to use all the power necessary for the defence, security,
and administration of the state, till the Cortes should mark out the
precise bounds of its authority. The responsibility,” they added, “to
which the Regents were subjected, was only meant to exclude that
absolute inviolability which appertained to the sacred person of the
king.” The whole of a night-session was occupied in forming this answer.
Among the many erroneous opinions which prevailed in this country
respecting the affairs of Spain, the most plausible and the most
general was that which expected great immediate benefit from the
convocation of the Cortes; an error from which, perhaps, no person
was entirely free, except the few, who, like Mr. Frere, looked to the
assembly rather with apprehensions of evil than with hope. But any
great immediate advantage, any rapid acceleration of the deliverance
of Spain, ought not to have been expected, unless it was supposed that
the Spanish deputies would proceed like the French national convention,
and that a revolutionary delirium might have produced a preternatural
and overpowering strength. There was as little reason to look for this,
as there could be for desiring it. The Spaniards, more than any other
Europeans, are attached to the laws and customs of their country. Spain
is to them literally a holy land; and its history, being composed for
many ages of a tissue of connected miracles, to the greater part of
the people sanctifies its institutions. But unless the Cortes took the
executive power into its own hands, and gave the nation a revolutionary
impulse, which all circumstances forbade, it might have been known that
the benefits to be expected would produce little or no immediate effect
upon the operations of the war: if that assembly acted wisely they
would be slow, certain, and permanent.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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