After the Nassau battalions had passed over to Lord Wellington’s camp, immediate advice had been dispatched to Sir William Clinton; and the information was with due secrecy communicated to the officer who commanded the Nassau troops in Catalonia; but this person preferring what he considered his military obligations to his national duty, delivered the papers into General Habert’s hands, who had succeeded Maurice ♦THE GERMAN TROOPS IN BARCELONA DISARMED.♦ Mathieu in the command at Barcelona. The French would, perhaps, have been better pleased if he had followed the example of his better-minded countrymen; for that German feeling which the officer had renounced existed among the men, and it was deemed necessary to disarm them all, 2400 in number, thus weakening the army of Catalonia, and bringing upon it this additional inconvenience, that the men of whose services it was deprived were to be supported as prisoners, and guarded also. This officer was mortally wounded a few weeks afterwards in a sally from Barcelona. ♦TROOPS WITHDRAWN FROM SUCHET’S ARMY.♦ Suchet’s force was still farther weakened by the withdrawal of 2000 of his Italian troops; he then proposed to the French government, as a measure of expediency, that they should dismantle the city of Barcelona, and content themselves with occupying the citadel and Fort Monjuic, whereby 5000 of the garrison would be disposable for service; but his advice was rejected, the possession of Barcelona being deemed necessary for the support of the army in Catalonia. About the same time two strong battalions of Spaniards were detached from the Anglo-Sicilian army, at the pressing request of General Roche, to assist him in blockading Murviedro. Tarragona had now been so far repaired as to be in a defensible state; but such was the exhausted condition of the province that no stores of any kind could be obtained from it for the Spanish authorities. ♦FAILURE OF AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ENEMY AT MOLINS DEL REY. JANUARY.♦ While both armies were withheld from undertaking any important operation by the diminution of strength on both sides, and by the increasing difficulties of obtaining supplies on the part of the Anglo-Sicilians, a plan was concerted between Sir William Clinton and Manso for attacking the enemy’s cantonments at Molins del Rey and the adjoining villages on the Llobregat: Sir William was to move with 8000 men upon the Barcelona road and attack them in front, while Manso should post himself upon the strong ground in the rear of Molins del Rey, close to the only road by which they could retire. Copons had assented to this project, and agreed to lend Manso and his brigade for this service, both the men and their commander being worthy of all confidence. ♦JAN. 17.♦ The enterprise failed, because Copons, without making any communication to the English General, instead of sending Manso, chose to go himself with a larger force, set off two hours later than the time which had been agreed