During the Seven Years' War, England made various diversions—in addition to those in America and the East Indies—to distract the French in their operations against the Allied Army in Germany. One of these was the attack on the Island of Belleisle on the west coast of France, between Port Louis and the mouth of the Loire. It was devised in the hope of inducing the French to detach some of their forces from Germany, for the defence of their own coasts; but in this respect it failed. Another motive, which inspired the English Government, was that they might gratify the lust for conquest, which at that time animated the people, whetted instead of satiated by their successes in the East and in the West. To a certain extent, it succeeded in this; but after counting the cost of the victory, it required the most exaggerated statements on the part of the Ministry to reconcile the nation to the expenditure of life and money caused by the Siege of Belleisle, if indeed it can be said ever to have been reconciled. The English nation has characteristics, which are displayed at every stage of its history. Lavish during war in order to gain its ends, it is disposed to be penurious during peace; and the favourite stalking-horse to power then is a profession of economy. The whole of Europe stood amazed at the readiness with which the English nation granted enormous supplies for the carrying on of the war ending in 1762; and this had perhaps as much effect as military success in persuading the French to consent to the disastrous conditions of the Peace of Paris. It may be said that, as a nation, the English sink political differences during war, and show a union almost peculiar to themselves. The only case in which war and political differences existed simultaneously to any great extent was during the American War of Independence; the reasons then were exceptional, and the result fatal. As a consequence of political union, comes a demand for vigorous administration; and the success of Mr. Pitt's ministry was due to his knowledge of this. The Siege of Belleisle was an illustration of this knowledge. It cannot be said that in time of peace the English insist on such administrative vigour; in fact, vigorous action in the head of a department is viewed with distrust and suspicion more frequently than with admiration. It is by remembering considerations such as these that a military operation such as is now to be described can be understood, almost valueless in its political results, expensive in its conduct, and—in a military point of view—worthless, save in so far as it strengthened (as only success can do) the _esprit_ and courage of the Army.