At the siege of Belleisle, described in a former chapter, the failing ammunition of the enemy was indicated by the use of wooden and stone projectiles. The latter were used by the Royal Artillery at Gibraltar, but for a different reason. To check and distract the working-parties of the enemy, shell had been chiefly employed by the garrison; and the proficiency they attained in the use of these projectiles can easily be accounted for, when it is remembered how soon and how accurately every range could be ascertained; how eager the gunners were to make every shot tell; and how exceedingly important it was to check the continued advance of the enemy's works. For variety's sake, it would seem, for there was no need to economize shell at this time—in pure boyish love of change, the Artillerymen devised stone balls, perforated so as to admit of a small bursting-charge, and a short fuze; and it was found that the bursting of these projectiles over the Spanish working-parties caused them incredible annoyance. Although the fire of the garrison during the first epoch of the siege was the most important consideration, and its value could hardly be overrated, as to it alone was any hope due of prolonging the defence until help should come from England,—it was not the only distinctive feature of this time. It was during the blockade that the garrison was most sorely tried by the scarcity of food. And in forming our estimate of the defence of Gibraltar, it should never be forgotten that the defenders were always the same—unrelieved, without communication with any back country; and with hardly any reinforcements to ease the heavy duties. The 97th Regiment, which arrived during the siege, was long in the garrison before it was permitted, or indeed was able, to take its share of duty; and the hard work, as well as the hard fare, fell upon the same individuals. The statistics, given so curtly by Drinkwater, as to the famine in the place, enable us to realize the daily privations of the troops. At one time, scurvy had so reduced the effective strength of the garrison, that a shipload of lemons which arrived was a more valuable contingent than several regiments would have been. In reading the account of this, with all the quiet arguments as to the value of lemon-juice, and its effect upon the patients, one cannot but wish, that in every military operation there were artists like Drinkwater to fill in the details of those pictures, whose outlines may be drawn by military commanders, or by the logic of events, but whose canvas becomes doubly inviting through the agency of the other industrious and unobtrusive brush. Modern warlike operations suffer from an overabundance of description; but the skeleton supplied by official reports, and the frequent flabbiness of those rendered by newspaper correspondents, produce a result far inferior to the compact picture presented by a writer at once observant and professional.