The plan of operations formed by the British Commanders under instructions from home is well and succinctly described by the American writer, Lee: "It contemplated the annihilation of resistance in all the country between the Lakes and Albany; undisturbed possession of the Hudson River (thus severing the Union), and the conquest of Pennsylvania, whose capital (Philadelphia) was the metropolis of the American States." To carry out this plan, it was resolved that one British army should march from Canada, and another from New York, whose meeting would complete the separation of the Eastern from the Western States, north of New York. Two blunders were committed in this scheme. The first was the appointment of General Burgoyne to command the northern force, instead of General Carleton, who was well acquainted with the country; the second was the employment of a northern army at all. New York was in English hands, and the mastery of the sea was as yet undisputed. Had New York been made the base of operations, and an army been sent up the Hudson, with its communications with New York maintained by the navy, the separation of the States would have been assured. But when General Burgoyne with his 7000 men left Canada, and plunged into the American forest, he cut his communications with the base of his operations, and his case became more hopeless every mile he advanced. That it was not want of gallantry, but infamous strategy, which brought on the Sedan-like Convention of Saratoga, may be seen by the most cursory study, and is eloquently acknowledged in the following words by Lee, who, though an enemy, was not blind to the courage of his opponents:—"Where is the General who ever more prodigally risked his life in his country's cause, than the unfortunate Burgoyne? Where the army which more bravely executed its leader's will, than did that which he conducted? What danger was avoided? What effort unessayed? What privation not submitted to? What difficulties not encountered? But all terminated in disaster; and the army, from whose prowess so much was expected, yielded to its equal in courage, to its superior in number." The American army, under General Gates, was a little over 13,000 strong; Burgoyne's force did not exceed 5700|at the date of the capitulation. The interest to the Artilleryman, in the details of this expedition, is unaffected by its disastrous termination. From commencement to termination, order-books,[36] despatches, and regimental records, speak in terms of enthusiasm of the courage of the Artillery, and their gallant commander—Major-General Phillips—who, although only a Regimental Major, held the higher Army rank by brevet, and was second in command of the whole force. Of the service of the Artillery at the Battle of Stillwater, Cust, in his 'Annals of the Wars,' writes, "The Artillery did wonders;"—and of the retreat of the 7th October, the same author says, "Phillips and Riedesel were now ordered to cover the retreat, and