“The deliverance of the Peninsula was never due to the foresight and perseverance of the English ministers, but to the firmness and skill of the British Generals, and to the courage of troops whom no dangers could daunt and no hardships dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors of the Cabinet.”--NAPIER. In resuming the story of the Peninsular War, it will be seen that the narrative has to go back to an earlier date than that of the expedition described in the last chapter,--Sir Arthur Wellesley having returned from England to Lisbon, to take command of the army, so early as the 22nd April, 1809. But it has been thought better to clear the ground, so to speak, of the Walcheren Expedition, and thus to enable the reader to follow uninterruptedly the story of the operations, which terminated in the glorious victory of Talavera, and the subsequent withdrawal of the English troops from Spain to Portugal. The British Government still resolved that the English army in Spain should be merely an auxiliary one, and remained still undeceived as to the real state of the Spanish forces. Perhaps it was as well, therefore, that the army entrusted to Sir Arthur Wellesley was not a larger one; for the difficulty he encountered in obtaining provisions and transport from the Spaniards would have been insurmountable, had the forces under his command been more numerous. [Sidenote: Merida, 25 Aug. 1809.] “I do not think,” wrote Sir Arthur to Lord Castlereagh, “that matters would have been much better if you had sent your large expedition to Spain instead of to the Scheldt. You could not have equipped it in Galicia, or anywhere in the north of Spain. If we had had 60,000 men instead of 20,000, in all probability we should not have got to Talavera to fight the battle, for want of means and provisions. But if we had got to Talavera, we could not have gone farther, and the armies would probably have separated for want of means of subsistence, probably without a battle, but certainly afterwards.” The campaign of 1809, from beginning to end, was marked by obstinacy on the part of Spanish Generals, and faithlessness on the part of the Spanish Government; by inadequate supplies of money from England, and by difficulties with the Portuguese troops, not the less annoying because they were often petty; as well as by hardships which tried the discipline of the English troops quite as much as the retreat to Corunna, and which drew from [Sidenote: To Lord Castlereagh, dated Abrantes, 17 June, 1809.] Sir Arthur Wellesley the bitter words: “We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight; but we are worse than an enemy in a country; and, take my word for it, that either defeat or success would dissolve us.” The success which he almost dreaded came: the 27th and 28th July witnessed as gallant an exhibition of English courage as has ever been seen; but in a few days Sir Arthur wrote: “A starving army is actually worse than none.