muskets, and put an end to the engagement, which, in point of losses, had been on both sides very severe. Of the Artillery on this occasion, Napier wrote that it played on both sides across the river and ravine, the sounds repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke, slowly rising, resolving itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole chasm and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. Cust, in his ‘Annals of the Wars,’ describes the Chestnut Troop, from the high ground, sending well-directed shot over the heads of the skirmishers. The gallant officer who [Sidenote: ‘Memoirs of Sir H. Ross,’ pp. 11, 12.] commanded the troop wrote as follows: “General Crawford ordered a retreat. Lieutenant Bourchier, of the Artillery, brought me the order to retire, as rapidly as in my power, across the bridge, and to get my guns into position on the opposite heights. At this time we had five guns in action.... Our fire was excellent, and broke them two or three times.” Captain Ross’s brother, an officer of Engineers, who was serving with the army, writes of this combat of the 24th July: “Hew’s guns did their duty.” The loss on the English side during this engagement was over three hundred killed and wounded; that of the French was over a thousand. But a battle on a larger scale has now to be mentioned. Lord Wellington retreated towards Coimbra, followed by Marshal Massena on the north hank of the Mondego. The English General resolved to make a stand on the Sierra de Busaco, a high ridge which extends from the Mondego in a northerly direction about eight miles. In the battle which followed, Lord Wellington displayed an ignorance of Artillery tactics, from the results of which he was happily saved by the intelligence and gallantry of the representatives of that arm. This want of knowledge, which he never overcame, was the cause of a not unfrequent irritation against Artillery [Sidenote: Capt. T. B, Strange, R.A., on Practical Artillery.] as an arm, and a tendency to depreciate its value. At Busaco, instead of massing his Artillery in reserve until the attack should develop itself, the guns were placed, as a rule, in the easiest parts of the position, where it was supposed the French _would_ attack; and they were massed in these positions so as to form an excellent mark for the enemy’s fire. This was more especially the case with Major Arentschild’s 6-pounder and 9-pounder brigades of Portuguese Artillery. Fortunately, the Artillery was well served, and, [Sidenote: ‘Life of Sir J. Burgoyne,’ vol. 1.] as Sir John Burgoyne wrote, “the guns had great effect.” Captain Thompson’s company of the 7th Battalion--now D Battery, 11th Brigade, Royal Artillery, was of essential service, although it was broken up into divisions during the [Sidenote: MS. Letter among Cleaveland’s MSS.] battle. Captain Lane, who was 2nd Captain of the company, thus describes the conduct of one division: “My men did their duty. Lieutenant F. Bayley’s conduct was admirable.