strove to cover the headlong flight of the others. The strength of the Allied army at Salamanca was 46,000, that of the French 42,000; but the superiority in point of numbers on the side of the Allies was caused by the presence of some utterly useless Spanish troops. The French had 74 guns on the field, the Allies only 60. These, according to Napier, were as follows:- Royal Horse Artillery. Three troops 18 guns. Royal Foot Artillery. Two 9-pounder brigades 12 ” Royal Foot Artillery. Two 12-pounder ” 12 ” King’s German Artillery. One 9-pounder ” 6 ” Portuguese and British brigaded together 6 24-pr. howitzers. One Spanish battery 6 guns. -- Total 60 pieces. -- There would certainly appear to be an error in this statement. In none of Colonel Dickson’s manuscripts can it be traced that there were more than five 24-pounder howitzers with his brigades; it would therefore seem that the strength of the Allied Artillery at Salamanca was even more disproportionate than that given, and that Lord Wellington had only 59 guns against Marmont’s 74. The losses on both sides at Salamanca were very heavy. The Allies lost 1 General, 24 officers, and 686 men killed; and 5 Generals, 182 officers, and 4270 men wounded. The loss of the French has never been exactly stated. They lost 7000 prisoners alone, besides 11 guns and other [Sidenote: Cust’s ‘Annals of the Wars.’] trophies. An approximation to their real loss has been obtained by taking General Clausel’s statement of the army on the 18th of the following month. He had succeeded Marshal Marmont in the command, on the latter being wounded; and on the 18th August he reported that the army, which had been 42,000 strong on the 22nd July, had fallen to 21,800, with 50 instead of 74 guns. Much of the loss may have occurred during the pursuit after the battle, but the whole was virtually attributable to the contest of the 22nd.