The Earl of Cromarty and his son, Lord MʻLeod, having been partners in the guilt of rebellion in 1745, were made partners in the punishment which followed. At length pardoned, Lord MʻLeod was permitted to pass into honourable exile. He found employment in the Swedish army, where he rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General. Opportunely venturing to return, he was unexpectedly received with much favour by the King, and his offer to raise a Highland regiment on his forfeited estates gladly accepted. His success was worthy of his zeal; and at Elgin, in 1778, he appeared at the head of a magnificent corps of 840 Highlanders, 236 Lowlanders, and 34 English and Irish, which were accordingly regimented as the Seventy-third, afterwards our Seventy-first Regiment. The success of this corps induced the formation of a second battalion, which soon attained its complement. Although styled the “Glasgow Highland Light Infantry,” that western metropolis can boast no legitimate claim to an interest in its formation beyond the thirty-four English and Irish recruits, who, it is said, hailed from Glasgow. It acquired the property, at a later period, when a second battalion was being grafted upon the parent stem, when many of its citizens enlisting, manifested so strong a predilection in its favour, as induced the government to confer the present title, and ever since the Glasgowegians have proudly adopted the Seventy-first as their own. Almost immediately on its completion, the first battalion was embarked for India. Landing at Madras in 1780, it became the nucleus for the Highland Brigade, which the subsequent and successive arrival of the Seventy-second, Seventy-third, Seventy-fourth, Seventy-fifth, and Ninety-fourth Highland regiments constituted. These earned distinctions for gallant service almost exceptional to themselves. It is worthy of note—eliciting our surprise, yet reflecting infinite credit on our arms—that notwithstanding the insignificance of the British force, opposed to the countless hosts of the Indian chiefs—generally as one to ten—we almost always prevailed. Had the native pride been less rampant, and the Indian chiefs submitted to the superior generalship of the French officers sent out to discipline their troops—wherein was admirable material for good soldiers—the danger to the British would have been greater, and success more exceptional. Fortunately for us, the incapacity of these sable chiefs to command, and their exceeding fear of dictation, lost them many an opportunity, and in the end proved our safety. It is strangely true of the Indian soldier that, in the field, when well led, he behaves with the utmost firmness, whilst, in defence of fortifications or walled towns, he betrays a weakness which altogether belies any favourable impression of his resolution previously formed. Notwithstanding the overwhelming superiority of the enemy who, under Hyder Ali, threatened annihilation to the small force of 4600 men,