History of the transmission of ancient books to modern times: together with the process of historical proof; or, a concise account of the means by which genuineness of ancient literature generally, and the authenticity of historical works especially are ascertained including incidental remarks upon the relative strength of the evidence usually adduced in behalf of the Holy ScripturesTaylor, Isaac
History
History of the transmission of ancient books to modern times: together with the process of historical proof; or, a concise account of the means by which genuineness of ancient literature generally, and the authenticity of historical works especially are ascertained including incidental remarks upon the relative strength of the evidence usually adduced in behalf of the Holy Scriptures
Taylor, Isaac
Bible -- Evidences, authority, etc.; Historiography; Transmission of texts
What say you?--The man who thinks there are no gods is impious? But is
not he who thinks them to be cruel and malignant, chargeable with an
opinion that is much more impious? For my own part, I would rather that
men should say, ‘There is no such person as Plutarch,’ than that they
should affirm that Plutarch is a man capricious, instable, prone to
wrath, revengeful of accidental affronts, pettish; one who, if you have
neglected to invite him with others to a feast, or if, being otherwise
engaged, you have failed to salute him at your gate, will devour you,
or seize and torture your son; or will send a beast, which he keeps for
the purpose, to ravage your fields.
Plutarch speaks of four states of mind, as known and existing in
his times--namely, 1. The wise piety, which he recommends, and
which forms the medium between superstition and atheism.--2. The
joyous or _festive_ worship of the gods, in which he sees nothing to
reprehend.--3. A bold rejection of all religion, which he thinks _an
error_, though an innocent error:--and 4. Superstition, which is not
merely an error, but a practical evil of the worst kind. Of the first
he says almost nothing; nor does he offer a single hint explanatory
of the mode in which the gods and goddesses of the Greek mythology
might be made the objects of a devout and reasonable piety:--and yet
piety without a god, must be an unmeaning term. Plutarch’s piety is
a vague sentiment, which he feels to be proper to human nature, and
highly beneficial; but which was absolutely destitute of solid ground,
or certainty; for no invisible being or beings were known to him whom
he could both love and fear. Even if the philosopher, by a course of
doubtful reasonings, might work out for himself an idea of the Deity,
such as might keep alive the sentiment of piety, no such abstruse
notion could be brought within the apprehension of the vulgar. What is
there then left to the vulgar?--not atheism--for that is an error:--not
superstition; for that is a tormenting mischief:--nothing remains but
the festive worship of the gods; and this, with all its impurities, and
all its follies, was the only portion that could be assigned to the
millions of mankind:--Plutarch knew of no alternative on which to found
the religious sentiments of men. Yet on another occasion he expresses
his opinion strongly as to the necessity of religion for the support of
the social system.--It seems to me that it were easier to build a city
without a foundation, than to construct or to preserve a polity, from
which all belief of the gods should be removed. Yet how great soever
were the evils of atheism, he deemed those arising from superstition
to be greater. According to his testimony, when the only theology
known to the Greeks took possession of timid minds, it rendered life
intolerably burdensome.--Of all kinds of fear, none produces such
incurable despondency and perplexity as superstition. He who never goes
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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