Assuming that the latter view was correct, Giles gave his reasons for holding that the new Judiciary should be abolished; and the subject led him into a history of the circumstances under which the Act passed, at the moment when the House of Representatives was in permanent session, “in the highest paroxysm of party rage,” disputing over the choice between Jefferson and Burr as President. He charged that members of the legislature who voted for the law “were appointed to offices, not indeed created by the law, the Constitution having wisely guarded against an effect of that sort, but to judicial offices previously created by the removal, or what was called the promotion, of judges from the offices they then held to the offices newly created, and supplying their places by members of the legislature who voted for the creation of the new offices.” He showed that the business of the courts “is now very much declined, and probably will decline still more.” “Under the view of the subject thus presented, he considered the late courts as useless and unnecessary, and the expense therefore was to him highly objectionable. He did not consider it in the nature of a compensation, for there was no equivalent rendition of service. He could not help considering it as a tribute for past services; as a tribute for the zeal displayed by these gentlemen in supporting principles which the people had denounced.” Such arguments, if good for the new circuit courts, were still stronger in their application to the Supreme Court itself. Giles affirmed that the “principles advanced in opposition ... go to the establishment of a permanent corporation of individuals invested with ultimate censorial and controlling power over all the departments of the government, over legislation, execution, and decision, and irresponsible to the people.” He believed that these principles were “in direct hostility with the great principle of representative government.” Undoubtedly these principles, if they existed anywhere, were strongest, not in the circuit, but in the Supreme Court; and if any judge was to be set aside because his appointment might be considered as a reward for zeal displayed in supporting “principles which the people had denounced,” Chief-Justice Marshall, the person most likely to exercise “ultimate censorial and controlling power over all the departments of government,” was peculiarly subject to suspicion and removal. To no man had the last President been more indebted, and to no one had he been more grateful.