“This state of things has naturally excited a sentiment of common interest, and has encouraged me to enter with more freedom into the subject, as well with the President as with Mr. Madison, than I should otherwise have thought right, without being acquainted with the views of his Majesty’s government. Under this impression, I ventured, immediately after the nomination and before the first arrival of Mr. Monroe, to inquire of the President whether it was his intention to let him pass over to England, and hold any conversation with his Majesty’s ministers upon the general question of the free navigation of the Mississippi. The inquiry was somewhat premature, and I made it with some apology. Mr. Jefferson replied, however, unaffectedly, that at so early a stage of the business he had scarcely thought himself what it might be proper to do; ... that, on the whole, he thought it very probable that Mr. Monroe might cross the Channel.... Some time after Mr. Monroe’s arrival, actuated by the same view, I mentioned to Mr. Jefferson that it would give me pleasure to furnish the former with an introduction to his Majesty’s ambassador at Paris, as it would afford me the occasion of making Lord Whitworth acquainted with the nature of the object in dispute between this country, France, and Spain, and would give to Mr. Monroe, if he were disposed of himself, or were instructed by his Government to seek it, a more ready pretext for opening himself to his Lordship, and of keeping him apprised of the progress and turn of the negotiation. Mr. Jefferson seemed pleased with this offer, and said he was sure Mr. Monroe would accept it with great thankfulness.” Madison talked less freely than his chief, and contented himself with explaining to the British representative that the views of the Government in sending Monroe to France were limited to the hope of inducing the First Consul by money, or other means of persuasion, to cede in Louisiana a place of deposit over which the United States might have absolute jurisdiction. He did not tell Thornton of the decision made by the Cabinet, and the instructions given to Monroe, April 18, 1803, to offer terms of alliance with England in case the First Consul should make war;[246] but the tone of cordiality in Government and people, both in public and private, in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, as in the South and West, was gratifying to British pride, and would have been still more so had not the community somewhat too openly avowed the intention of leaving England, if possible, to fight alone. At the first news of the approaching rupture between France and England, this wish began to appear so plainly that Thornton was staggered by it. The Americans took no trouble to conceal the hope that England would have to fight their battles for them.[247]