History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas JeffersonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas Jefferson
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
That a people, like an individual, should for a time choose to accept
a wrong, like impressment or robbery, without forcible resistance
implied no necessary discredit. Every nation at one time or another had
submitted to treatment it disliked and to theories of international
law which it rejected. The United States might go on indefinitely
protesting against belligerent aggressions while submitting to them,
and no permanent evil need result. Yet a treaty was a compromise which
made precedent; it recorded rules of law which could not be again
discarded; and above all, it abandoned protest against wrong. This was
doubtless the reason why Jefferson wished for no treaties in the actual
state of the world; he was not ready to enforce his rights, and he was
not willing to compromise them.
The treaty signed by Monroe and Pinkney Dec. 1, 1806, was remarkable
for combining in one instrument every quality to which Jefferson held
most strenuous objections. The three ultimata were all abandoned;
impressments were set aside under a diplomatic memorandum which
rather recorded the right than restrained its exercise; no indemnity
was obtained for the ravages made on American commerce in 1805; and
in regard to the colonial trade, a compromise was invented which no
self-respecting government could admit. Article XI. of the treaty
imposed the condition that West Indian produce, coming from French or
Spanish colonies, and _bonâ fide_ the property of United States
citizens, might be exported from American ports to Europe on condition
that it should have paid to the United States custom-house a duty
of not less than two per cent _ad valorem_, which could not be
returned in drawback; while European merchandise might in the same way
be reexported from the United States to the West Indies, provided
it paid not less than one per cent _ad valorem_ in duties to
the American Treasury. This provision was only to be compared with
Article XII. of Jay’s treaty, in which Lord Grenville insisted and
Jay agreed that the United States should export no cotton. Even Pitt
had never proposed anything so offensive as the new restriction. He
had indeed required that the American merchant whose ship arrived at
Baltimore or Boston with a cargo of sugar or coffee from Cuba should
unload her, carry the hogsheads and cases into a warehouse, and pass
them through all the forms of the American custom-house; after which
he must turn about and stow them again on shipboard,--an operation
which was usually reckoned as equivalent, in breakage, pilfering, and
wages, to a charge of about ten per cent on the value of the cargo; but
he had not ventured to levy a duty upon them to be paid to the United
States government. One step more, and--as a clever London pamphleteer
suggested--the British government would require the American stevedores
to wear the King’s livery.[287] Had it been stipulated that the
custom-house payments should be taken as full proof of neutrality
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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