History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas JeffersonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas Jefferson
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
If Monroe flattered himself that he had for the moment checked British
aggression, he quickly learned his error. The treaty had been signed
barely a week when a new Order in Council appeared, which surpassed any
belligerent measure of the Tories.[291] Beginning with the premise that
Napoleon’s Berlin Decree “would give to his Majesty an unquestionable
right of retaliation, and would warrant his Majesty in enforcing the
same prohibition of all commerce with France which that Power vainly
hopes to effect against the commerce of his Majesty’s subjects,” the
order added that King George felt himself bound “to retort upon them
the evils of their own injustice,” and therefore “ordered that no
vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, both
which ports shall belong to, or be in the possession of, France or
her allies.” In other words the Whig ministers, ignoring their fresh
treaty with the United States and even the note appended to it,
declared that they would not wait for America to resent the Berlin
Decree, but that United States vessels must in future, as a retort for
that decree, be deprived of the right to sail from one European port
to another. The custom had hitherto prevailed among American shippers
of seeking a market according to ruling prices, partly perhaps at
Bilbao or Bordeaux, partly at some other French or Mediterranean port.
Lord Howick’s order of Jan. 7, 1807, which cut short this coasting
privilege, was a blow to American commerce sharper than the famous
decision of Sir William Scott in the case of the “Essex.” Its apparent
effect was to double the cost and risk of neutral commerce, while
incidentally it asserted a right to prohibit such trade altogether.
Unfortunately more remained behind. The new order was not only an act
of violence; it was, according to the Tories, also one of meanness.
On its face it purported to be a measure of retaliation, taken in
order to retort upon France the evils of Napoleon’s injustice. In the
Parliamentary debate four weeks afterward, when the order was attacked,
all parties argued it as a matter of retaliation. The King’s advocate,
Sir John Nicholls, who defended it, took the ground that for the moment
no severer retaliation was needed; while Spencer Perceval and Lord
Castlereagh held that Napoleon’s decree should have been retaliated in
full.
“You might turn the provisions of the French decree against
themselves,” said Perceval;[292] “and as they have said that
no British goods should sail freely on the seas, you might say
that no goods should be carried to France except they first
touched at an English port. They might be forced to be entered
at the custom-house, and a certain entry imposed, which would
contribute to advance the price and give a better sale in the
foreign market to your own commodities.”
Sir John Nicholls replied:[293]--
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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