“I also think,” said Gallatin,[133] “that an embargo for a limited time will at this moment be preferable in itself and less objectionable in Congress. In every point of view--privations, sufferings, revenue, effect on the enemy, politics at home, etc.--I prefer war to a permanent embargo. Governmental prohibitions do always more mischief than had been calculated; and it is not without much hesitation that a statesman should hazard to regulate the concerns of individuals, as if he could do it better than themselves. The measure being of a doubtful policy, and hastily adopted on the first view of our foreign intelligence, I think that we had better recommend it with modifications, and at first for such a limited time as will afford us all time for reconsideration, and if we think proper, for an alteration in our course without appearing to retract. As to the hope that it may have an effect on the negotiation with Mr. Rose, or induce England to treat us better, I think it entirely groundless.” To this remarkable letter the President immediately replied by summoning the Cabinet together at ten o’clock in the morning.[134] No record of the consultation was preserved; but when the Senate met at noon the Message was read by the Vice-president as it had been shaped by Madison. The suggestion of Gallatin as to a limit of time had not been adopted. The Senate instantly referred the Message to a committee of five, with General Smith and J. Q. Adams at its head:-- “We immediately went into the committee-room,” recorded Senator Adams in his Diary,[135] “and after some discussion, in which I suggested very strong doubts as to the propriety of the measure upon the papers sent with the President’s Message, I finally acquiesced in it as a compliance with the special call for it in the Message. I inquired whether there were other reasons for it besides the diplomatic papers sent with the Message, as _they_ appeared to me utterly inadequate to warrant such a measure. Smith, the chairman, said that the President wanted it to aid him in the negotiation with England upon which Mr. Rose is coming out, and that perhaps it might enable us to get rid of the Non-importation Act. I yielded. But I believe there are yet other reasons, which Smith did not tell. There was no other opposition in committee.”