Erskine’s report was nearly exact. In regard to Robert Smith, it was confirmed by a letter written at the same moment by Smith to the President;[333] and so far as concerned Madison, Gallatin, and George Clinton, it was not far wrong. A month then passed while Congress drifted toward a decision. At last, about December 1, Erskine roused himself to an effort. Doubtless Madison and Gallatin knew his purpose,--perhaps they inspired it; but in any case, Erskine acted rather in their interests than in the spirit or policy of Canning. December 3 the British minister wrote to his Government the first of a series of despatches calculated to bring Canning to his senses. “The Government and party in power,” said he,[334] “unequivocally express their resolution not to remove the embargo, except by substituting war measures against both belligerents, unless either or both should relax their restrictions upon neutral commerce.” To reinforce this assertion Erskine reported an interview with Secretary Madison, who after reviewing the facts had ended by explicitly threatening a declaration of war. He said in substance-- “That as the world must be convinced that America had in vain taken all the means in her power to obtain from Great Britain and France a just attention to their rights as a neutral Power by representations and remonstrances, that she would be fully justified in having recourse to hostilities with either belligerent, and that she only hesitated to do so from the difficulty of contending with both; but that she must be driven even to endeavor to maintain her rights against the two greatest Powers in the world, unless either of them should relax their restrictions upon neutral commerce,--in which case the United States would side with that Power against the other which might continue the aggression. Mr. Madison observed to me that it must be evident that the United States would enter upon measures of hostility with great reluctance, as he acknowledged that they are not at all prepared for war, much less with a Power so irresistibly strong as Great Britain; and that nothing would be thought to be too great a sacrifice to the preservation of peace, except their independence and their honor. He said that he did not believe that any Americans would be found willing to submit to (what he termed) the encroachments upon the liberty and the rights of the United States by the belligerents; and therefore the alternatives were, Embargo or War. He confessed that the people of this country were beginning to think the former alternative too passive, and would perhaps soon prefer the latter, as even less injurious to the interests, and more congenial with the spirit, of a free people.”